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EXPLORING THE MERITS OF A 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental objective of the American justice system is to ascertain 
the truth underlying litigated disputes.2  Most modern evidence rules arose 
from and evolved in furtherance of this objective.3  Testimonial privileges, 
also commonly referred to as evidentiary privileges,4 are an exception.5  
 
2. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Truth is the essential 
objective of our adversary system of justice.”); Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(“The foundation of our adversary system is the search to elicit the truth from witnesses concerning 
factual occurrences.”). 
3. See Ottinger v. Siegfried, 349 F.2d 647, 649 (10th Cir. 1965) (“[A] lawsuit is a search for truth, 
and rules of evidence are designed and should be utilized to bring the whole truth of a case before the 
trier of the facts.”); Dall. Cty. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 1961) 
(“If they are worth their salt, evidentiary rules are to aid the search for truth.”). 
4. See Lincoln Am. Corp. v. Bryden, 375 F. Supp. 109, 111 (D. Kan. 1973) (referring to “the 
existence of a testimonial or evidentiary privilege created by statute or common law”); see also Sean A. 
Devlin, Comment, Union Communications Privilege: Is It Time for Ohio to Protect Union Representative-Member 
Communications?, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 677, 679 n.13 (2017) (“Privileges are distinguished by testimonial 
or evidentiary privilege.  Although commonly used interchangeably, there is a slight difference.  
Testimonial privilege is defined as ‘a right not to testify based on a claim of privilege; a privilege that 
overrides a witness’s duty to disclose matters within the witness’s knowledge, whether at trial or by 
deposition.’  Evidentiary privilege is defined as ‘a privilege that allows a specified person to refuse to 
provide evidence or to protect the evidence from being used or disclosed in a proceeding,’ and includes 
attorney-client privilege.” (citation omitted) (first citing Testimonial Privilege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014); then citing Evidentiary Privilege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014))). 
5. See Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1253 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Unlike other rules of 
evidence, rules of privilege . . . are intended to further public policies and protect primary conduct 
extrinsic to the judicial process.”), vacated on other grounds sub nom, United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 
488 U.S. 1036 (1989). 
2
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Although evidentiary in nature,6 privileges typically involve the protection 
of socially valuable relationships that have little or no relation to the courts’ 
truth-seeking function.7  Indeed, by enabling witnesses to withhold relevant 
evidence,8 privileges often impede the judicial search for truth.9  For this 
and other related reasons,10 courts—and many modern evidence 
scholars11—generally view testimonial privileges with disfavor.12 
 
6. See United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541, 1566 (D. Colo. 1996) (“[P]rivileges are 
evidentiary rules of exclusion . . . .”); Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1356 
(N.M. 1976) (“There can be no real question about rules of privilege being rules of evidence, when 
considered in the context of being exceptions to the general requirement and liability of everyone to 
give testimony or furnish evidence upon all facts inquired of in a court of justice.”). 
7. See Int’l Union, UAW v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 323, 328 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2014) 
(“[T]ruth-seeking is not the only interest or principle at stake in litigation; if it was, there would be no 
need for any privileges, the very purpose of which is to protect against the disclosure of information 
notwithstanding its relevance.”); Montone v. Radio Shack, 698 F. Supp. 92, 94–95 (E.D. Pa. 1988) 
(“[E]ach of the traditionally-recognized privileges . . . can be traced to an interest in fostering and 
protecting a relationship of high social importance.”). 
8. See Frank v. Allstate Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 3d 569, 574 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“With evidentiary 
privileges, relevant information is withheld to serve the greater good of preserving confidential 
relationships or marital harmony.”); Steiny & Co. v. Cal. Elec. Supply Co., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 920, 924–
25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“Privileges authorize withholding of relevant evidence . . . .”). 
9. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Each of the recognized privileges 
protects a substantial individual interest or a relationship in which society has an interest, at the expense 
of the public interest in the search for truth.”); People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Ill. 1983) 
(“[E]videntiary privileges . . . exclude relevant evidence and thus work against the truthseeking function 
of legal proceedings.  In this they are distinct from [other] evidentiary rules, such as the prohibition 
against hearsay testimony, which promote this function by insuring the quality of the evidence which 
is presented.”); State v. Heaney, 689 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Minn. 2004) (“Unlike other rules of evidence 
that are concerned solely with the reliability of evidence and its ability to guide the court to the truth, 
privileges are an impediment to truth-finding.”). 
10. See, e.g., Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 185 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[E]videntiary privileges are 
not designed to further litigation efficiency.  Instead, privileges generally cause . . . delay and consume 
judicial resources in resolving claims of privilege that arise both at trial and during discovery, aspects 
of litigation which most rules of evidence seek to minimize.”). 
11. See In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1981) (“In recent times, commentators have 
tended to view privileges as hindering litigation and have generally advocated a narrowing of the 
field.”); Bailey v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 179 N.W.2d 560, 572 (Iowa 1970) (Uhlenhopp, 
J., dissenting) (“[S]ince exclusionary rules necessarily prevent the jury from hearing some relevant 
information, contemporary authorities in the field of evidence resist extension of privileged 
communications to new professions and oppose expansion of existing privileges beyond necessity.”). 
12. RLI Ins. Co. v. Conseco, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 741, 748 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“Courts disfavor 
assertions of evidentiary privilege because they shield evidence from the truth-seeking process.”); 
Parvarandeh v. Goins, 124 F.R.D. 169, 171 (E.D. Tenn. 1988) (“Courts do not favor creating new 
privileges . . . .”). 
3
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Despite this institutional bias,13 the concept of a witness being 
“privileged” to withhold evidence in certain situations (or concerning 
certain matters)14 is firmly embedded in American law.15  Some 
professional relationships, in particular, enjoy the protection of a testimonial 
privilege.16  Generally speaking, these privileges encourage and facilitate 
frank and open communications between individuals and the professionals 
from whom they seek counseling, advice, or medical treatment.17 
 
13. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244, 246 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(“[T]he search for truth in society’s quest to administer justice creates a strong presumption against 
testimonial privileges because they result in the suppression of competent evidence.”); Student 1 v. 
Williams, 206 F.R.D. 306, 309 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (“American jurisprudence is firmly biased in favor of 
testimony and against privilege . . . .”); Rockford Police Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Morrissey, 
925 N.E.2d 1205, 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“[T]he judiciary has an institutional bias against creating a 
heretofore unknown privilege as a matter of common law.”). 
14. See People v. May, 748 P.2d 307, 314–15 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“A privilege may 
grant an exemption from the duty to take the stand, as where the person involved is a criminal 
defendant or the spouse of a party.  Or it may grant an exemption from the duty to give testimony on 
certain matters, such as facts that may tend to incriminate the witness or the substance of confidential 
communications in any of several protected relationships, including for example that of attorney and 
client.” (citation omitted)). 
15. See Elson v. Bowen, 436 P.2d 12, 14 (Nev. 1967) (“The common law of evidence has long 
recognized certain rules of privilege which authorize the withholding of pertinent facts in a judicial 
proceeding.”); Nissa M. Ricafort, Note, Jaffe v. Redmond: The Supreme Court’s Dramatic Shift Supports the 
Recognition of a Federal Parent-Child Privilege, 32 IND. L. REV. 259, 260 (1998) (“One goal of the adversarial 
judicial system is to place all relevant evidence before the trier of fact.  Although privileges impede this 
goal, they have been a part of the American judicial system since the founding of our country.” 
(footnote omitted) (citing Brian S. Faughnan, Comment, Evidence–Jaffe v. Redmond: Establishing the 
“Psychotherapist–Patient Privilege” Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 703, 
705 (1997))). 
16. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1161 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997) (Mansmann, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (referring to the “professional testimonial privileges . . . between attorney 
and client, priest and penitent, and physician and patient”); Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege’s 
Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, 
the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 20 (“Most traditional privileges arise when a 
professional relationship is established: attorney-client, physician-patient or cleric-parishioner.”). 
17. See Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct. of Ariz., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(“The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage candid communications between client 
and counsel.”); Urseth v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1057, 1064 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (“The purpose of 
the physician-patient privilege . . . is to encourage frankness and open communication between the 
patient and his or her physician.”); Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Evidentiary Privileges in 
International Arbitration, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 345, 350 (2001) (“[A]ll professional privileges have the 
same rationale—to encourage open communications between professionals and those with whom they 
have a professional relationship.”). 
4
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In addition, both the state and federal courts recognize a privilege 
protecting confidential communications between spouses,18 which is 
commonly known as the marital communications privilege.19  This 
testimonial privilege has existed since the mid-nineteenth century (if not 
longer),20 and it promotes family harmony by encouraging people to 
communicate frankly and openly with their spouses.21 
 
18. See State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158, 1173 (Conn. 2004) (“Our conclusion, recognizing the 
existence of a privilege for confidential marital communications, aligns us with every other jurisdiction 
in the country.”), superseded by statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84a, as recognized in State v. Bennett, 
324 Conn. 744 (2017); Katharine T. Schaffzin, Beyond Bobby Jo Clary: The Unavailability of Same-Sex Marital 
Privileges Infringes the Rights of so Many More Than Criminal Defendants, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 103, 113 (2014) 
(“All state and federal jurisdictions in the United States recognize the confidential marital 
communications privilege in some form.”). 
19. United States v. Griffin, 440 F.3d 1138, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2006).  This privilege “applies 
only to those marital communications which are confidential.”  United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 
730 (9th Cir. 1990).  A related “adverse spousal testimony” privilege enables a witness “to refuse to 
testify against a spouse, even about non-confidential communications or acts.”  Jimenez v. Amgen 
Mfg. Ltd., 692 F. Supp. 2d 219, 221 (D.P.R. 2010).  However, the adverse spousal testimony privilege 
has “been subject to considerable criticism, and the empirical basis of the privilege has been seriously 
called into question.”  In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 691 (3d Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted).  
As a result, some states have abandoned the privilege, “relying solely on the marital communications 
privilege to protect marital privacy.”  State v. Mauti, 3 A.3d 624, 632 n.7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010).  For a discussion of this issue, see David Medine, The Adverse Testimony Privilege: Time to Dispose of 
a “Sentimental Relic”, 67 OR. L. REV. 519, 521 (1988) (discussing the marital communications privilege). 
20. The marital communications privilege has been described as “the second oldest testimonial 
privilege recognized at common law,” purportedly predated only by the attorney-client privilege.  
United States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942, 945 (D. Colo. 1982) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2333 (McNaughton rev. ed., 1961)).  However, there is 
considerable uncertainty surrounding the origin of the privilege, which stems from the fact that at 
common law “one spouse was totally disqualified from testifying either for or against the other.”  
People v. D’Amato, 430 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).  This testimonial disqualification 
eliminated any “practical need for a separate rule dealing just with confidential marital 
communications.”  Brown v. State, 753 A.2d 84, 91 (Md. 2000).  Thus, while the marital 
communications privilege may have existed in practice at early common law, it does not appear to have 
been formally recognized until the English Evidence Amendment Act of 1853 “abolished the 
testimonial disqualification of husbands and wives.”  State v. Hurley, 876 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tenn. 1994), 
superseded by statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201(b), as recognized in State v. Power, 101 S.W.3d 383 
(Tenn. 2003); see State v. Pratt, 153 N.W.2d 18, 20–21 (Wis. 1967) (“While some early legal scholars 
conceived and articulated the policies supporting the privilege for marital communications, judicial 
recognition was virtually nonexistent until 1853 since the wider disqualification of incompetency left 
little opportunity for the question of the existence of such a privilege to be considered.”). 
21. United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir. 1974); see Mark Reutlinger, 
Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect 
Marital Privilege, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1358–59 (1973) (“As is true of any of the communication 
privileges, . . . protecting against involuntary disclosure of confidential marital communications is 
intended primarily to encourage such communication and thereby to preserve and foster an intimate 
relationship between spouses.”). 
5
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There also appears to be growing support for a broader array of family 
privileges,22 with numerous commentators advocating for some form of 
parent-child privilege,23 which has been adopted by statute or judicial 
decision in several states24 and recognized by a few federal courts.25   
Some commentators have asserted that there is a colorable basis for 
recognizing a comparable sibling privilege.26  However, the courts  
have not been receptive to the latter argument,27 and with rare  
 
22. See Under Seal v. United States, 755 F.3d 213, 219 n.6 (4th Cir. 2014) (“New York state 
courts have recognized a privilege against divulging private familial communications, with emphasis on 
the privacy of the family unit.”); Norman Abrams, Unpacking the Power of an Ante-Litigation Limitation on 
Consultation-for-Advice/Treatment Evidentiary Privileges, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1089, 1126 (2003) 
(“A . . . general category of situations to which [a] proposed new privilege might be applicable involve 
familial relationships—particularly the parent-child situation, but sometimes involving siblings and on 
occasion, even more distant relationships.”). 
23. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1158 (3d Cir. 1997) (Mansmann, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (referring to the “spate of articles by academicians and other legal commentators 
who, virtually uniformly, favor incorporating a parent-child testimonial privilege into the fabric of the 
law”).  For the author’s contribution to this dialogue, see Michael D. Moberly, Children Should Be Seen 
and Not Heard: Advocating the Recognition of a Parent-Child Privilege in Arizona, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 515 (2003). 
24. See Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1162 (Mansmann, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Three states (Idaho, Massachusetts and Minnesota) have adopted some variant of the parent-child 
privilege by statute, and one state, New York, has judicially recognized the privilege.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
25. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Unemancipated Minor Child, 949 F. Supp. 1487, 1497 
(E.D. Wash. 1996) (“[T]he Court concludes that reason and experience, as well as the public interest, 
are best served by the recognition of some form of a parent-child privilege.”); see also In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings of Doe, 842 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting how the District Court of Nevada and 
the District Court of Connecticut “have recognized a parent child or family privilege”).  
26. See Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 
1167 (2007) (observing the rationale for recognizing a parent-child privilege “could be applied 
to . . . intrafamilial privileges between brothers and sisters”); Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial 
Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 924 (1987) (“To be sure, a case can be made for extending a 
testimonial privilege to siblings . . . who, like parents and children, have a tie of kinship that is 
associated with lifelong fidelity.”) [hereinafter Parent-Child Loyalty]; see also Michael D. Moberly, Am I 
My Brother’s Secret-Keeper? Contemplating the Recognition of a Sibling Testimonial Privilege, 41 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 239, 308–09 (2017) (discussing how Jaffe v. Richmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) opened the possibility 
of a sibling privilege because siblings rely on each other for guidance). 
27. See State v. Wright, 378 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (“There is no authority 
establishing a privilege for sibling communications and we are unwilling to find such a privilege 
exists.”).  But see Port v. Heard, 594 F. Supp. 1212, 1219 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (“If the law of intrafamily 
privilege were extended beyond the narrow spectrum of spousal privilege, it would be very difficult to 
stop at the parent-child level.  This is so since the . . . argument could then be logically extended to 
brothers, sisters, grandparents, cousins, nieces, nephews, aunts, and uncles.”). 
6
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exceptions,28 no other family relationships are protected by a testimonial 
privilege.29 
There is also no testimonial privilege protecting confidential 
communications between friends.30  This fact is so, despite the undeniable 
societal importance of friendship31 and the fact that, like the relationships 
that typically are protected by a testimonial privilege,32 friendships may 
benefit by the participants’ ability to maintain the confidentiality of their 
communications,33 or—perhaps of equal importance—be harmed by their 
 
28. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 474 N.Y.S.2d 931, 932 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984) (extending New York’s 
common law parent-child privilege to an individual’s confidential communications with a grandparent 
who stood “in the place and stead of his parent.”); see also Sarah Tupper, Note, Taking the Ninth: A 
Victim’s Right of Privacy, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 457, 476 (2008) (“A very small number of decisions 
have recognized some form of intra-family, non-spousal, testimonial privilege.”). 
29. See United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There is no judicially or 
legislatively recognized general ‘family’ privilege . . . .”); Sandra Guerra, Family Values?: The Family as an 
Innocent Victim of Civil Drug Asset Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 355 n.52 (1996) (“[T]he privilege 
not to testify does not extend to siblings or more remote relations.”); Sanford Levinson, Testimonial 
Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 645 (“American law does not recognize a 
sibling privilege, let alone other kinship privileges.”). 
30. See United States v. Lockwood, 386 F. Supp. 734, 738 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“Courts have not, 
in general, recognized any privilege of a . . . friend to refuse to testify on grounds analogous to those 
underlying the husband-wife privilege.”); Bryant v. Livigni, 619 N.E.2d 550, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) 
(“The law does not recognize a ‘friendship privilege’.”); Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA 
L. REV. 631, 699 (2007) (“Our relationships with our spouses (and our children and parents in some 
jurisdictions) . . . are protected from discovery in public proceedings, but our communications with 
our best friends have no such protection.”); Stacey A. Garber, Note, Cox v. Miller: The Clergy Privilege 
and Alcoholics Anonymous, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 917, 926 (2003) (asserting “confidential communications 
made to friends . . . are not privileged”). 
31. See Markel et al., supra note 26, at 1205 (“[O]ur society values friendship as a very beneficial 
social relationship of trust but fails to entrust friends with testimonial privileges . . . .”); Peter P. 
Gelzinis, Note, Do Friends Need the Law? Examining Why Friendship Matters and What Governments Can Do 
for This Important, Though Overlooked, Relationship, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 523, 524 (2012) (“Laws give 
special preference to family members through . . . testimonial privileges for spouses, . . . but the law 
overlooks the important role that friends have in our lives.”). 
32. See Estate of Kime v. Barnard, 193 Cal. Rptr. 718, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“[T]he purpose 
of the attorney-client privilege is to preserve and enhance the confidential relationship between 
attorney and client. . . .”); Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 275 (Wyo. 1994) (“[T]he confidential marital 
communication privilege . . . enhances the quality of marital relationships by encouraging confidential 
communication between spouses.”).  See generally Ellen Deason, Note, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
and Discovery of Affirmative Action Plans in Title VII Suits, 83 MICH. L. REV. 405, 427 (1984) (noting 
traditionally recognized privileges “function to protect and enhance a relationship”). 
33. See Ferdinand Schoeman, Friendship and Testimonial Privileges, in ETHICS, PUBLIC POLICY, & 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 257, 264 (Frederick Elliston & Norman Bowie eds., 1982) (asserting an “attribute 
of ideal friendship is that the friends can reliably trust one another with information about themselves 
even if it reveals problems with their character”); Lewis H. Margolis, Taking Names: The Ethics of Indirect 
Recruitment in Research on Sexual Networks, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 159, 161 (2000) (“[C]onfidentiality is 
7
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inability to do so.34  Indeed, while courts occasionally pay lip service to the 
value of friendship,35 the relationship remains largely unprotected in 
American law.36  And unlike the parent-child privilege,37 which has 
received a great deal of (mostly favorable)38 scholarly attention,39 there has 
been very little scholarly consideration of a possible friendship privilege.40 
 
 
a basic component of . . . friendship and other intimate social relationships, although not guided by the 
same formal expectations as occur in a professional setting.”). 
34. See United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 1978) (“Friendship is 
frustrated . . . when our confidences are . . . publicly disclosed.”), vacated on other grounds, 441 U.S. 929 
(1979); Robert S. Catz & Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L. REV. 89, 111 n.117 (1987) (“Honest 
testimony may strain a valued friendship.”); cf. Gelzinis, supra note 31, at 543 (“[O]ne who has betrayed 
the trust and intimacy of a friend seems particularly worthy of condemnation . . . .”). 
35. See Piscottano v. Murphy, 317 F. Supp. 2d 97, 106 (D. Conn. 2004) (“[T]he Court does not 
intend in any way to demean or belittle the value of friendship and fellowship.”); Strong v. United 
States, 665 A.2d 194, 201 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., dissenting) (“Friendship can be a powerful 
relationship.”); Michael J. Kaufman, The Value of Friendship in Law and Literature, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 
645, 646 (1992) (asserting the law “has exploited the language of friendship, while debasing the value 
of friendship”). 
36. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766  F.3d 648, 660 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[M]any people want to enter into 
relations that government refuses to enforce or protect (friendship being a notable example).”); Frost 
v. Lawrence, 122 N.Y.S. 913, 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910) (“The law does not attempt to regulate the 
relation of friendship of either men or women.”); Sarah Baumgartel, Privileging Professional Insider Trading, 
51 GA. L. REV. 71, 107 (2016) (“The supposed duty of confidentiality among . . . friends is not 
otherwise recognized in law, so their conversations are in no way shielded from public discovery.”); 
Kaufman, supra note 35, at 650 (asserting “a subtle pattern has developed in the law within which the 
value of friendship implicitly is either ignored or rejected”). 
37. See generally J. Tyson Covey, Note, Making Form Follow Function: Considerations in Creating and 
Applying a Statutory Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 896 (“A parent-child privilege . . . 
would seem quite logical as a companion measure to the marital privilege.  A privilege for intimate 
friends . . . is not a logical companion measure to the marital privilege because such relationships, even 
when involving much affection, have characteristics that distinguish them from familial bonds.”). 
38. See In re Inquest Proceedings, 676 A.2d 790, 791 (Vt. 1996) (noting “commentators have 
argued in favor of a parent-child privilege”); Jessica Perry, Note, The Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: An 
Argument for Qualified Recognition, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 97, 105 (1999) (“[P]ublic policy arguments in favor 
of creating the parent-child privilege abound from legal commentators and academics.”). 
39. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d 1140, 1146 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he myriad of law 
review articles discussing the parent-child testimonial privilege”); People v. Dixon, 411 N.W.2d 760, 
762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (“In recent years, the subject of establishing a parent-child testimonial 
privilege has received considerable scholarly attention.”). 
40. See Gelzinis, supra note 31, at 548 (asserting “the value of friendship has been overlooked 
by serious thinkers”); Andrew Jensen Kerr, Coercing Friendship and the Problem with Human Rights, 
50 U.S.F. L. REV. F. 1, 4 (2015) (lamenting the fact “we have survey courses, law reviews, and court 
systems dedicated to the legal protection and regulation of the family, but—until very recently—have 
generally ignored friendship”); Leib, supra note 30, at 703 (asserting the law of testimonial privilege is 
a “legal domains where more sensitivity to friendship could be usefully developed to protect a 
friendship’s privilege of privacy”). 
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This article is a modest attempt to fill that void.41 
Part I of the article explains that a friendship privilege was not among the 
privileges recognized at common law.  In Part II, the author discusses the 
courts’ authority to create new, previously unrecognized testimonial 
privileges.  The author examines the renowned Wigmore test for 
recognizing new common law privileges in Part III of the article.  Part IV 
notes that a few scholars favor the recognition of a friendship privilege, and 
Part V explores the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s seminal 
decision in Jaffee v. Redmond 42 on that possibility.  Part VI identifies a 
significant definitional impediment to the recognition of a friendship 
privilege and discusses some potential responses to that problem.  The 
author ultimately concludes that there is at least a colorable basis for 
recognizing a friendship privilege, and calls for further judicial and academic 
consideration of that possibility. 
II.    NO FRIENDSHIP PRIVILEGE EXISTED AT COMMON LAW 
The concept of a testimonial privilege came to this country as part of the 
common law of England,43 where it arose in response to the courts’ 
emerging authority (nonexistent until the sixteenth century)44 to compel 
witnesses to testify.45  Although it has been suggested that “a form of the 
 
41. See generally Gelzinis, supra note 31, at 548 (“Maybe our approach to thinking about friends 
is starting to change.  Scholars of both philosophy and law are beginning to think seriously about the 
place friends have in our lives.  Lawmakers should pick up this conversation.”); R.A. Lenhardt, According 
to Our Hearts and Location: Toward a Structuralist Approach to the Study of Interracial Families, 16 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUST. 741, 766 (2013) (“Legal scholars have focused on questions of friendship in recent 
years.”). 
42. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
43. See Cook v. King Cty., 510 P.2d 659, 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (describing privilege as a 
“common law concept”); Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 
1457 (1985) (footnote omitted) (“By the early 1800s, English courts had begun to develop a common 
law of evidentiary privileges, and American judges tentatively looked to this emerging law to help them 
decide privilege questions.”) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Philip A. Elmore, Comment, “That’s 
Just Pillow Talk, Baby”: Spousal Privileges and the Right to Privacy in Arkansas, 67 ARK. L. REV. 961, 964 
(2014) (“American courts adopted evidentiary privileges from English common law, where certain 
privileges were recognized as early as the sixteenth century.”). 
44. See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1441 (11th Cir. 1997) (observing that “all 
nonparty witness testimony was voluntary until the mid-sixteenth century”); In re Marshall, 805 N.W.2d 
145, 151 (Iowa 2011) (“Common law in the fifteenth century did not recognize the right to compel a 
witness to testify in criminal proceedings.  Over time, however, the common law evolved to the point 
where witnesses had a duty to testify and could be compelled to do so.”). 
45. See In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 47 (Idaho 1985) (Bistline, J., concurring) (“The 
concept of privilege arose in England in the 1600’s.  It developed only after witnesses could be 
9
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friendship idea underlies the early justification for the privileged 
communication rule in the law of evidence,”46 relatively few testimonial 
privileges actually existed under English common law,47 and a privilege for 
confidential communications between friends was not among them.48  One 
court described the situation in the following terms: 
For too long to make it worthwhile to investigate, and in too many cases to 
make it worthwhile to recite, the law has limited the matters as to which a 
witness may claim a privilege not to testify.  And . . . a witness has no legal 
right to refuse relevant information merely because in furnishing it he will 
betray a friend, or inform against a confidant.49 
  
 
compelled to testify.”); Howe v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 487 N.W.2d 374, 386 (Mich. 1992) (Boyle, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“At common law, the rules of privilege were developed as a 
protection against the court’s power to compel testimony.”). 
46. Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Love Got to Do with It?” “It’s Not Like They’re Your Friends for Christ’s 
Sake”: The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211, 212 n.5 (2003); see also 
Leib, supra note 30, at 659 (“Some . . . suggest that vast swaths of our legal system are themselves 
predicated on friendship, and that our law would not be possible without an underlying conception of 
friendship undergirding it.”). 
47. See Terre Haute Reg’l Hosp., Inc. v. Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d 1358, 1360 (Ind. 1992) (“Most 
privileges were unknown at common law . . . .”); Jeffrey J. Lauderdale, A New Trend in the Law of Privilege: 
The Federal Settlement Privilege and the Proper Use of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition of New 
Privileges, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 260–61 (2005) (“[A]t common law, very few privileges were defined 
and recognized.”). 
48. One court went so far as to assert there “were no privileges at common law,” and all 
privileges instead “arise, if at all, statutorily.”  Harlan v. Lewis, 141 F.R.D. 107, 109 (E.D. Ark. 1992); 
see also Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 1972) (Godbold, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that “the whole concept of privilege” was “largely unknown 
to the common law”).  Although this is an exaggeration, it has been credibly argued that “the only 
privileges recognized at common law were the attorney-client and marital privileges.”  Devlin, supra 
note 4, at 684. 
49. United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548, 567 (D. Mass. 1960); cf. State v. McKnight, 
243 A.2d 240, 250 (N.J. 1968) (“A man could not escape his confession to a friend or relative because 
he thought . . . the friend or relative could not testify against him.”).  But see Commonwealth v. Blood, 
507 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 1987) (citation omitted) (quoting Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 
(1769)): 
At common law “[i]t is certain every man has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases.  
He has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them public, or commit them only to the 
sight of his friends.” . . . Thus, it has long been thought reasonable to expect that what is 
supposedly said only to friends or close associates will not become generally, indiscriminately 
known . . . without the speaker’s consent. 
10
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III.    THE COURTS’ AUTHORITY TO CREATE NEW TESTIMONIAL 
PRIVILEGES 
Despite the common law underpinnings of American privilege law,50 
modern courts are not limited to applying only those privileges that existed 
under English common law.51  In this regard, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence,52 enacted in 197553 as part of a comprehensive codification 
of federal evidence law,54 expressly authorizes the federal courts to adopt 
new common law privileges.55 
 
50. See, e.g., Marshall v. Anderson, 459 So. 2d 384, 386 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (“[V]irtually 
the entire federal law of privilege is based upon the common law rather than either rule or statute.”); 
see also Peterson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360, 363 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (noting “much 
of the law of privileges is uniquely judge-made”); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: 
Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 246 (1998) 
(“Throughout the history of the common law, judges have created privileges to protect important 
societal interests.”). 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 55 F. Supp. 375, 376 (D. Minn. 1944) (“Federal courts 
are not bound by the common-law rules which governed a . . . privilege to testify in 1789 or any other 
year . . . . Federal courts can expand or contract these common-law rules as modern experience and 
necessity demand in the interest of justice.”) (construing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933)); 
see also Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (“When reason and experience call 
for recognition of a privilege which has the effect of restricting evidence the dead hand of the common 
law will not restrain such recognition.”). 
52. Rule 501 states, in relevant part, that—unless otherwise provided by the United States 
Constitution, a federal statute, or a Supreme Court rule—“[t]he common law—as interpreted by 
United States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege” in federal 
cases.  FED. R. EVID. 501.  See Comment, In the Light of Reason and Experience: Rule 501, 71 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 645 (1976) (providing an early examination of the rule). 
53. Rule 501 has been amended once, in 2011, but the changes “were meant to be stylistic only.”  
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kugler, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1329 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2011); see also 
Executive Mgmt. Servs. Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, 309 F.R.D. 455, 459 n.1 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (“Rule 501 
was amended only stylistically in 2011, without intent to change a result in any ruling.”). 
54. See Coy v. Renico, 414 F. Supp. 2d 744, 768 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“In 1975, Congress codified 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, gathering together the disparate common law evidentiary rules that had 
been developed by the federal courts.”); Gilman v. Choi, 406 S.E.2d 200, 209 (W. Va. 1991) (Neely, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence are merely a judicial 
codification of common law principles, and remain part and parcel of the common law.”), overruled in 
part on other grounds by Mayhorn v. Logan Med. Found., 454 S.E.2d 87, 94 (W. Va. 1994). 
55. See Northwestern Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The 
creation of new common law evidentiary privileges is authorized by Fed. R. Evid. 501 . . . .”); In re Int’l 
Horizons, Inc., 689 F.2d 996, 1003 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Rule 501 clearly provides federal courts with the 
statutory power to recognize new or ‘novel’ evidentiary privileges.”). 
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Several states have adopted similar rules,56 effectively codifying their own 
courts’ common law authority to recognize new privileges.57  Both state and 
federal courts have exercised this authority to expand the number of existing 
privileges.58  Notable examples include the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege recognized by the Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond,59 and the 
priest-penitent (or as it is now commonly called, clergy-communicant)60 
privilege recognized by several state and federal courts,61 and all but certain 
to be recognized by the Supreme Court, if it is ever directly presented with 
the issue.62  While the courts seem destined to continue this “evolutionary 
 
56. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Superior Ct., 809 P.2d 428, 430 (Ariz. 1991) (“The Arizona version 
of Rule 501 is very similar to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”); State v. Roach, 669 N.E.2d 
1009, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (noting “the similarity in language between Rule 501 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and Rule 501 of the Indiana Rules of Evidence”); State v. Smorgala, 553 N.E.2d 
672, 676 (Ohio 1990) (“The [Ohio] rule adopts the same approach to privilege as is found in Fed. Evid. 
R. 501.”). 
57. See Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 598, 598 n.1 (1983) (“Several states have adopted versions of Rule 501 which empower the state 
courts to develop common law rules governing . . . privilege.”). 
58. See, e.g., In re Queen’s Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We find, 
consistent with Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, that a patent-agent privilege is justified ‘in 
the light of reason and experience.’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501)); United States v. Wimberly, 60 F.3d 
281, 285 (7th Cir. 1995) (“This Court has . . . adopted a psychotherapist/patient privilege under Fed. 
R. Evid. 501.” (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)); In re 
Production of Records to Grand Jury, 618 F. Supp. 440, 441 (D. Mass. 1985) (“[T]his court recognizes, 
as a matter of federal evidentiary law, a qualified privilege for . . . communications made to a social 
worker in his or her professional capacity . . . insofar as the communication relates to the care and 
treatment of the patient.”); Senear v. Daily Journal-Am., 641 P.2d 1180, 1184 (Wash. 1982) (“We hold 
there is a common law qualified privilege for journalists in civil cases.”). 
59. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996); see also Section V infra (discussing the Jaffee case). 
60. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 197 n.1 (Pa. 1997) (“Pennsylvania courts 
have commonly referred to the privilege as the ‘priest-penitent’ privilege.  This term is used in a 
representative rather than a limiting manner . . . .  We adopt the term ‘clergy-communicant’ privilege 
for purposes of this Opinion.”); see also United States v. Burgess, No. 1:14-CR-2022-TOR, 2015 WL 
13674174, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 4,2015) (“Although not explicitly listed in Rule 501, several courts 
have recognized the existence of the clergy-communicant privilege, sometimes referred to as the priest-
penitent privilege.”). 
61. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[W]e hold that a 
clergy-communicant privilege does exist.”); Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 
No. CV 93 302072, 1995 WL 348181, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 31, 1995) (“[T]his court holds, as a 
matter of common law, that confidential communications made by or to a member of the clergy in his 
or her religious capacity are privileged from disclosure . . . .”); see also Nestle v. Commw., 470 S.E.2d 
133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining although there is some debate over the issue, “most scholars 
conclude that the priest-penitent privilege is not a part of England’s common law legacy”). 
62. In re Grand Jury, 918 F.2d 374, 382 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 
40, 45 (1980) (“The Supreme Court has ‘acknowledged the existence of a “priest-penitent” privilege.’”); 
see also United States v. Durham, 93 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1295−96 (W.D. Okla. 2015) (“There is no Tenth 
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development of testimonial privileges,”63 friendship may not be among the 
relationships likely to benefit from this evolution.64 
IV.    WIGMORE’S TEST FOR RECOGNIZING NEW PRIVILEGES 
A. Background 
Despite widespread agreement that the law recognizes no friendship 
privilege,65 case law addressing the issue is relatively sparse.66  The few 
courts to have considered the issue have typically refused to recognize the 
privilege without offering any meaningful analysis in support of their 
decisions.67  Indeed, the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas’ decision in 
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc.68 might be the only notable 
 
 
Circuit authority outlining the scope of any clergy-communicant privilege, but the Court has little 
difficulty concluding that the Supreme Court would acknowledge such a privilege, having [previously] 
done so in dicta . . . .” (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 45)). 
63. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47; see also New York Times Co. v. Gonzalez, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 505 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Rule 501 . . . was intended to allow for the evolution of the common law and the 
development of new privileges as a result.”), vacated on other grounds, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006); 
D’Aurizio v. Borough of Palisades Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 n.2 (D.N.J. 1995) (“Rule 501 endorses 
‘a continuation of the evolution of a federal common law of privileges which began long before the 
Rules of Evidence were enacted.’” (quoting CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 172, at 226 (2d ed. 1994))); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1324 (D. Nev. 
1983) (“Rule 501 recognized and arguably even advocated the evolution of new testimonial privileges 
as they were deemed necessary by courts in the future.”). 
64. See Kaufman, supra note 35, at 655 (stating the “relationships which the law in various states 
has valued enough to protect with an evidentiary privilege have . . . expanded greatly,” but “the 
relationship among friends is still absent”). 
65. See, e.g., Evans v. Vare, 203 F. App’x 95, 97 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A relationship between friends 
is not privileged.”); see Brannon v. Finkelstein, No. 10-61813-CIV-GRAHAM/O’SULLIVAN, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145171, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2012) (indicating “communications between 
friends” are “not privileged communications”); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
66. See generally Gelzinis, supra note 31, at 533 (“There is scant case law dealing directly with the 
nature of friendship . . . .”); Orly Rachmilovitz, Bringing Down the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing Substance 
Over Form in Personalized Abuse, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495, 533 (2008) (“In contrast to 
families and lovers, friendships have been systematically ignored by the law in many areas . . . .”). 
67. This phenomenon is not unique to the potential friendship privilege.  See, e.g., Gregory W. 
Franklin, Note, The Judicial Development of the Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Too Big for Its Britches?, 
26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 166 (1984) (“Many courts that have refused to recognize the [parent-
child] privilege have done so without thorough analysis.”). 
68. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010).  See Mallory Allen & Aaron Orheim, Get Outta My Face[book]: The Discoverability 
of Social Networking Data and the Passwords Needed to Access Them, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 137, 146–
48 (2012) (providing a previous discussion of McMillen). 
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exception.69 
McMillen arose out of a stock car racing accident in which the plaintiff 
claimed to have suffered significant injuries, some of which were allegedly 
permanent.70  The defendants sought access to the plaintiff’s social media 
sites,71 arguing that posts on those sites might contain evidence relevant to 
his claimed injuries.72  The plaintiff refused to provide the requested 
access,73 asserting that his private communications with his “friends”74 on 
 
69. The Pennsylvania courts may lack the constitutional authority to recognize new common 
law privileges.  See, e.g., Tannenbaum v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 65 Pa. D. & C.2d 700, 702 (C.P. 
Allegheny Cty. 1974) (“Power to prescribe rules of evidence and, per extenso, rules creating privileges 
not to testify, was specifically denied to Pennsylvania courts by the Constitutional Convention of 1967–
68 during the debate on the Judiciary Article, Resolution No. 1000, Con. Con. 1968.”).  But see In re 
Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d 126, 136 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting) (“[T]here can be 
no serious doubt that courts have the common law authority to judicially create testimonial 
privileges.”).  If that is the case, the McMillen court’s discussion of the merits of a friendship privilege 
may have relatively little impact in jurisdictions in which the courts do possess such authority.  See 
Moses v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 25 Phila. Cty. Rptr. 389, 406 (Pa. C.P. 1993) (“[E]ach state is free 
to enact her own privileges, and typically does so in a common law and/or legislative manner.”). 
70. See McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *1 (describing underlying facts in the case). 
71. The defendants served interrogatories on the plaintiff asking him whether he “belonged to 
any social network computer sites and, if so, that he provide the name of the site(s), his user name(s), 
his login name(s), and his password(s).”  Id.  This is a common litigation tactic; one prominent authority 
in the field has asserted that in the age of social media “by far the most contentious—and rapidly 
developing—area of discovery disputes centers around the extent to which a party seeking discovery 
can obtain direct and unfiltered access to its opponent’s social networking profile through the 
production of the resisting party’s Facebook password or other social networking site login 
credentials.”  John G. Browning, With “Friends” Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Passwords, Privacy, and the 
Discovery of Social Media Content, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 505, 508 (2013). 
72. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *1–2.  Summarizing the defendants’ position, the court 
stated: 
Accessing only the public portion of his Facebook page, . . . the defendants have discovered posts 
they contend show that [the plaintiff] has exaggerated his injuries.  Certainly a lack of injury and 
inability is relevant to their defense, and it is reasonable to assume that [the plaintiff] may have 
made additional observations about his travels and activities in private posts not currently 
available to the defendants. 
Id. at *11. 
73. See id. at *1. 
74. See, e.g., Chace v. Loisel, 170 So. 3d 802, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (“The word ‘friend’ 
on Facebook is a term of art.  A number of words or phrases could more aptly describe the concept, 
including acquaintance and, sometimes, virtual stranger.”); Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215, 
222 (Ky. 2012) (“[S]ome people have thousands of Facebook ‘friends,’ . . . which suggests that many 
of those relationships are at most passing acquaintanceships.  This is further complicated by the fact 
that a person can become ‘friends’ with people to whom the person has no actual connection, such as 
celebrities and politicians.”). 
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social media were “confidential and thus protected against disclosure.”75  
The court characterized this argument as an assertion that those 
communications were privileged.76 
Analyzing the issue under Dean John Henry Wigmore’s “classic utilitarian 
formulation of the conditions for recognition of a testimonial privilege,”77 
the McMillen court concluded that the inherently public nature of 
communications on social media78 “is wholly incommensurate with a claim 
of confidentiality,”79 as would be required in order to warrant recognition 
of the privilege under the Wigmore test.80  Given the unique—and 
 
75. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *3; cf. Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 
961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 662 (D.N.J. 2013) (“Facebook has customizable privacy settings that allow users 
to restrict access to their Facebook content.  Access can be limited to the user’s Facebook friends, to 
particular groups or individuals, or to just the user.”); Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 227 n.12 (“Facebook users 
may opt to make all or part of their Facebook information private, or they may opt to make this 
information public.”). 
76. See McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *3 (“[The plaintiff] asks the Court to recognize 
communications shared among one’s private friends on social network computer sites as confidential 
and thus protected against disclosure.  Because [the applicable rule] only makes privileged materials 
non-discoverable, he is essentially asking the Court to recognize a privilege for those 
communications.”); cf. State ex rel. Allen v. Bedell, 454 S.E.2d 77, 85 n.10 (W. Va. 1994) (Cleckley, J., 
concurring) (“[C]omplete confidentiality can generally be guaranteed only if an evidentiary privilege . . . 
applies.” (quoting MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 63 § 5.2, at 336)). 
77. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing 
WIGMORE, supra note 20 § 2285, at 527); see also Douglas v. Windham Sup. Ct., 597 A.2d 774, 777 (Vt. 
1991) (“Most courts have created a testimonial privilege only when the conditions meet the four-part 
test for recognition set forth in Dean Wigmore’s treatise.” (citing WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2285, 
at 527)). 
78. See Stroes v. Town of Davie, No. 18-62760-CIV-MORENO/SELTZER, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 87188, at *7 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2019) (“Courts throughout the country have repeatedly 
highlighted the public nature . . . of social media postings.”); Douglas H. Amster et al., #Litigation: Blogs, 
Tweets, Pokes, and Tags in the Courtroom, 44 BRIEF 50, 55 (2015) (discussing “the fundamentally public 
nature of social networking sites”). 
79. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *9; cf. Patricia Sánchez Abril & Anita Cava, Health Privacy in 
a Techno-Social World: A Cyber-Patient’s Bill of Rights, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 244, 255 (2008) 
(“The online social networking environment has brought about a sweeping change in its users’ notions 
of intimacy, friendship, and confidentiality . . . .  Consequently, the level of confidentiality users expect 
is almost impossible to assess without explicit requests or privacy settings.”). 
80. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 1012 
n.13 (D.N.J.) (“Wigmore’s test requires that the communications originate in a confidence that they 
will not be disclosed.”), aff’d, 879 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1989); State v. Post, 826 P.2d 172, 181 (Wash. 1992) 
(“As with all the evidentiary privileges, a person may not claim a privilege as to communications that 
do not originate in the confidence that they will not be disclosed.”). 
15
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tenuous81—nature of social media friendships,82 there is nothing 
particularly surprising about this result.83  However, because social media 
friendships “do not necessarily carry the same weight as true friendships,”84 
the McMillen court’s analysis has no clear application to more traditional 
friendships,85 which may well satisfy the Wigmore test.86 
B. The First Prong of the Test 
The Wigmore test consists of the following four criteria: 
 
81. See, e.g., Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 271 So. 3d 889, 
896 (Fla. 2018) (“[I]t is regularly the case that Facebook ‘friendships’ are more casual and less 
permanent than traditional friendships.”); see also Ira P. Robbins, Writings on the Wall: The Need for an 
Authorship-Centric Approach to the Authentication of Social-Networking Evidence, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
1, 12 n.54 (2012) (“Social-networking users can ‘unfriend’ others with whom they are friends.  This 
action removes both users from each other’s friends list.”) (citation omitted).  In fact, the practice of 
“unfriending” is so common that the term “was recognized by the Oxford American Dictionary as the 
word of the year in 2009.”  Aviva Orenstein, Friends, Gangbangers, Custody Disputants, Lend Me Your 
Passwords, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 189 (2012). 
82. See United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d 57, 67 n.16 (D. Mass. 2016) (“Over a billion 
people use Facebook and connect with other users as ‘friends.’  Some may be friends in the traditional 
sense, but others are no more than acquaintances or contacts or in some cases may even be complete 
strangers.”); Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215, 223 (Ky. 2012) (“[A] Facebook member may 
be ‘friends’ with someone in a strictly artificial sense.”); see also Wint v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 16-cv-
6250 (BMC), 2017 WL 3927460, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2017) (“Facebook friends are different than 
in-person friends . . . .”). 
83. Cf. Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“[M]aterial 
posted on a ‘private’ Facebook page, that is accessible to a selected group of recipients but not available 
for viewing by the general public, is generally not privileged . . . .”); Patterson v. Turner Constr. Co., 
931 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“[P]ostings on [a] plaintiff’s online Facebook account, 
if relevant, are not shielded from discovery merely because [the] plaintiff used the service’s privacy 
settings to restrict access . . . .”).  See generally Amster et al., supra note 78, at 54–55 (“[N]o court to date 
has credibly recognized a ‘social media privilege’ . . . .”). 
84. Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 222; see also Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein, 271 So. 3d at 897 (“Since 
the creation of a Facebook ‘friendship’ in itself does not signal the existence of a traditional ‘friendship,’ 
it certainly cannot signal the existence of a close or intimate relationship.”); Benjamin P. Cooper, Judges 
and Social Media: Disclosure as Disinfectant, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 521, 523 (2014) (“[P]eople 
generally understand that social media ‘friendship’ is less significant than traditional friendship . . . .”). 
85. See Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein, 271 So. 3d at 901 (Pariente, J., dissenting) (“[A]ny 
attempt to equate Facebook ‘friendship’ with traditional friendship ultimately fails.  The fact that both 
are called ‘friendship’ does not mean they are comparable or can be evaluated in the same manner.”). 
86. See Covey, supra note 37, at 881 n.20 (“[S]ome argue that relationships between close 
friends . . . might . . . qualify for privilege status under the Wigmore test.”); Comment, Functional Overlap 
Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE 
L.J. 1226, 1230 (1962) (“[R]elationships ranging from personal friendship to psychiatrist and patient . . . 
seem to meet the four Wigmore criteria.”) [hereinafter Functional Overlap]. 
16
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1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will 
not be disclosed. 
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community 
ought to be sedulously fostered. 
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for 
the correct disposal of the litigation.87 
Addressing the confidentiality requirement embodied in the first prong 
of the test,88 the McMillen court concluded that the nature of social media 
communications in general,89 and the privacy policies of Facebook and 
MySpace in particular,90 “dispel any notion that information one chooses 
to share [on those sites], even if only with one friend, will not be disclosed 
to anybody else.”91  The court noted, for example, that information 
contained in users’ communications on social media can be “disseminated 
by the friends with whom they share it,”92 which alone may warrant the 
conclusion that a user can have no reasonable expectation that such 
communications will remain confidential.93 
 
87. Walker v. Huie, 142 F.R.D. 497, 500 (D. Utah 1992) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 20 
§ 2285, at 527) (emphasis omitted). 
88. McMillan v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285, at *3 
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010); see also State ex rel. Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804, 810 
(Mo. 1984) (en banc) (Welliver, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps the best approach for determining when the 
public interest demands that a communication remain confidential is the four-pronged test established 
by Professor Wigmore.  First, there must be a communication between parties made with the 
understanding that the communication be kept confidential.”). 
89. See Rachel E. Lusk, Facebook’s Newest Friend—Employers: Use of Social Networking in Hiring 
Challenges U.S. Privacy Constructs, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 709, 710 (2014) (“[S]ocial media sites have opened 
what would otherwise be a private conversation between friends . . . to others, often without the 
speaker’s knowledge or consent to share that information.”). 
90. See generally Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) 
(“[N]either Facebook nor MySpace guarantee complete privacy . . . .”). 
91. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *3–4. 
92. Id. at *4; see also Garner K. Weng, Type No Evil: The Proper Latitude of Public Educational 
Institutions in Restricting Expressions of Their Students on the Internet, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 751, 
809 (1998) (“People familiar with the Internet are aware that messages are easily forwarded.  In some 
cases, it may appear that the message sender knew that the message could or would be forwarded to 
many others.”). 
93. See McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *3 (“[W]hile it is conceivable that a person could use 
[social network computer sites] as forums to divulge and seek advice on personal and private matters, 
17
Moberly: Exploring the Merits of a Friendship Privilege
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020
  
926 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:909 
In addition, Facebook’s privacy policy contains language cautioning users 
that “whomever else a user may or may not share certain information with, 
Facebook’s operators have access to every post[,]”94 and may disclose the 
information contained in those posts “pursuant to subpoenas, court orders, 
or other civil or criminal requests.”95  Noting that MySpace’s policies 
contain similar language,96 the McMillen court concluded that “no person 
choosing MySpace or Facebook as a communications forum could 
reasonably expect that his communications would remain confidential, as 
both sites clearly express the possibility of disclosure.”97 
The McMillen court found support for its conclusion in cases finding no 
testimonial privilege exists where otherwise confidential communications 
occur in the presence of third parties.98  Extending the reasoning of these 
cases to the social media context, the court stated: 
The law does not even protect otherwise privileged communications made in 
the presence of third parties.  When a user communicates through Facebook 
or MySpace, however, he or she understands and tacitly submits to the 
possibility that a third-party recipient, i.e., one or more site operators, will also 
be receiving his or her messages, and may further disclose them if the operator 
deems disclosure to be appropriate.99 
 
it would be unrealistic to expect that such disclosures would be considered confidential.”); cf. United 
States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (concluding an individual’s “legitimate 
expectation of privacy ended when he disseminated posts to his ‘friends’ because those ‘friends’ were 
free to use the information however they wanted”). 
94. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *4. 
95. Id. 
96. See id. at *5 (noting MySpace’s policies advise users that it “may choose to monitor users’ 
content or conduct, thereby explicating the fact of the operators’ unfettered access to a member’s 
communications”). 
97. Id.; see also Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (concluding 
Facebook and MySpace users have “no legitimate reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
98. See Logan v. Oliver, 96 A.2d 516, 517 (D.C. 1953) (“[C]ommunications made in the 
presence of a third party . . . are not confidential and therefore not privileged.”); State v. Topps, 
142 So. 3d 978, 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (“Generally, communications made in the presence of 
third parties, whose presence is known to the [communicant], are not privileged from disclosure.”). 
99. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *5 (citation omitted); cf. Catherine B. Sarson, Note, The 
Child-Parent Testimonial Privilege: Attempts at Codification Have Missed Their Mark, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 861, 879 (1999) (“The first condition of [the Wigmore] test requires that the communication 
be made with the expectation that it would remain confidential.  Courts have enforced this requirement, 
disallowing a privilege where the information was revealed to a third person.”) (footnote omitted). 
18
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2020], No. 4, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss4/3
  
2020] EXPLORING THE MERITS OF A FRIENDSHIP PRIVILEGE 927 
While this analogy may be apt insofar as social media friendships are 
concerned,100 it does not readily apply to communications between friends 
in other contexts.101  Although the issue is fact-sensitive,102 
communications between friends often occur in private,103 and any 
suggestion that friends can never expect their communications to remain 
confidential is unfounded,104 as the McMillen court itself clearly 
recognized.105  One commentator explained this in the following terms: 
Maintenance of confidentiality in regard to communications between close 
personal friends depends very much upon the kind of people involved, their 
ability to maintain confidences and the nature of their relationship.  Although 
 
100. See, e.g., Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (“[W]hen Plaintiff created her Facebook and 
MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal information would be shared with 
others, notwithstanding her privacy settings. . . .  Since Plaintiff knew that her information may become 
publicly available, she cannot now claim that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
101. See Condlin, supra note 46, at 267 (“True friends keep their friends’ confidences.  One can 
unburden one’s soul to a true friend.”); Gelzinis, supra note 31, at 543 (“[W]e expect that we can trust 
our friends, that they will keep what we tell them in confidence . . . .”); cf. Nucci v. Target Corp., 
162 So. 3d 146, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (noting postings on social networking sites “are 
unlike . . . communications . . . where disclosure is confined to narrow, confidential relationships”). 
102. See Jeffrey Begens, Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: An Absolute Right or an 
Absolute Privilege?, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 709, 721 (1986) (“Confidentiality determinations turn on the 
facts of the particular case . . . .”). 
103. See Padilla v. Terhune, 309 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing an individual who 
“made [an] admission to . . . a close friend, in a private setting”); Dow Chem. Co., Tex. Div. v. NLRB, 
660 F.2d 637, 650 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing an individual’s “statements . . . to personal friends in 
private conversations”); Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
1249, 1270 (2012) (“Friendships . . . can involve disclosures meant to be kept private; a person might 
confess, for example, to having racist thoughts to a very close friend but to no one else.”); see also 
Leyson v. Davis, 42 P. 775, 782 (Mont. 1895) (referring to “the unobtrusive confidence and privacy of 
close friendships”). 
104. See United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1466 (7th Cir. 1997) (referring to the 
“confidentiality . . . which might be expected as between friends discussing troubling circumstances”); 
Peckham v. Boston Herald, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 888, 891 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (“Where one discusses 
sensitive personal matters with a . . . trusted friend, one can often legitimately expect that these matters 
will remain confidential.”); Dairy Queen of Duncanville, Inc. v. O’Quinn, 502 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 1973) (“There is no limit to the number of confidences two friends may share, and these 
may be of the most intimate nature.”). 
105. See McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285, at *5 
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010) (“[O]ne may expect that his or her friend will hold certain information 
in confidence . . . .”). 
19
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there is no doubt that in many situations the requisite degree of confidentiality 
can be maintained, this will depend on the specific circumstances.106 
C. The Second Prong of the Test 
The second prong of the Wigmore test is its most important 
component.107  It focuses on whether confidentiality is essential to the 
maintenance of the relationship between the parties seeking the protection 
of the privilege under consideration.108  As one court observed, “the 
theoretical predicate underlying all recognized privileges is that secrecy and 
confidentiality are necessary to promote the relationship fostered by the 
privilege.”109 
Addressing this issue, the McMillen court concluded that confidentiality 
“is not essential to maintain the relationships between and among social 
network users.”110  Once again, this observation is undoubtedly correct.111  
However, the court then proceeded to assert—far less convincingly112—
 
106. Abrams, supra note 22, at 1127; see also Mitchell A. Agee, Note, Friends in Low Places: How 
the Law Should Treat Friends in Insider Trading Cases, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 345, 377–78 (2013) (“While 
some highly committed ‘friends’ may share personal confidences or intimacy, more casual ‘friends’ may 
only exchange pleasantries or exist on the basis of fun without sharing personal confidences or 
intimacy.”). 
107. In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d 126, 144 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting); 
see Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dangerous Trend Blurring the Distinction Between a Reasonable Expectation of 
Confidentiality in Privilege Law and a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 
57 LOY. L. REV. 1, 9 (2011) (“The paramount criterion is Wigmore’s requirement that ‘confidentiality 
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.’” (quoting 
WIGMORE, supra note 20 § 2285, at 527–28)). 
108. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 
1012 n.13 (D.N.J.) (“Wigmore’s second requirement is that confidentiality be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties.”), aff’d, 879 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Franklin, supra note 67, at 168 (“The second part of Wigmore’s test requires that confidentiality be 
essential to the relationship.”). 
109. In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Neil 
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 454 
(2016) (“[P]eople disclose more when they trust.  When they believe that the other party is trustworthy, 
they are more likely to share, just as they do with their doctors, lawyers, and spiritual advisors.”). 
110. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *5. 
111. See Amster et al., supra note 78, at 55 (“[U]nlike an attorney-client or physician-patient 
relationship, confidentiality between social network users is not essential to maintaining their online 
relationship; in fact, the opposite is true.”). 
112. See generally Hoge v. George, 200 P. 96, 102 (Wyo. 1921) (asserting that “trust and 
confidence . . . is the essence of [close] friendship”); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 484 (1968) 
(“To be friends . . . persons must be intimate to some degree with each other.  But intimacy is the 
20
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that the same is true of more traditional friendships.113  It reasoned as 
follows: 
No [privilege protecting communications between friends] currently exists.  
Friendships nonetheless abound and flourish, because whereas it is necessary 
to guarantee people that their attorneys, physicians, and psychologists will not 
disseminate the substance of their discussions in order to encourage the type 
and level of disclosure essential to those professional relationships, history 
shows that the same guarantee is not necessary to encourage the development 
of friendships.114 
This analysis is unpersuasive.115  It mirrors the analysis in In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings,116 where the Third Circuit concluded that “confidentiality—in 
the form of a testimonial privilege—is not essential to a successful 
parent-child relationship, as required by the second [Wigmore] factor.”117  
The court reasoned that “strong and trusting parent-child 
relationships . . . have existed throughout the years without the concomitant 
existence of a privilege protecting that relationship.”118 
 
sharing of information about one’s actions, beliefs, or emotions which one does not share with all, and 
which one has the right not to share with anyone.”). 
113. See McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *5 (“The relationships to be fostered through [social] 
media are basic friendships, not attorney-client, physician-patient, or psychologist-patient types of 
relationships, and . . . the maintenance of one’s friendships typically does not depend on 
confidentiality.”). 
114. Id. at *6; cf. Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal 
Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 26 (2011) (“Since most social network 
communications are based on friendships and social relationships, not attorney-client, 
physician-patient, or psychologist-patient types of relationships, they cannot be considered 
privileged.”). 
115. See Glorsky v. Wexler, 59 A.2d 233, 235 (N.J. Ch. 1948) (“Friendships . . . are fragile things 
and it is not always possible to keep them in constant repair.”); cf. United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 
589 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that privileges “protect those interpersonal relationships which are highly 
valued by society and peculiarly vulnerable to deterioration”). 
116. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997). 
117. Id. at 1152; cf. Covey, supra note 37, at 897 n.149 (“Some commentators . . . argue against 
the [parent-child] privilege, claiming that . . . a privilege would add nothing to the permanency of the 
relationship and thus is unnecessary.”). 
118. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d at 1157 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State 
v. Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297, 1301–02 (Wash. 1988) (“It appears highly doubtful to us that a parent-child 
privilege would encourage . . . disclosure, or that the absence of such a privilege would impair the 
success of a given parent-child relationship . . . .  Bonds other than shared secrets typically hold the 
parent-child relationship together.”). 
21
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However, this is not necessarily an accurate characterization of the 
parent-child relationship,119 let alone the relationship between friends.120  
Indeed, the Third Circuit’s reasoning failed to persuade one of the judges in 
that case121 who favored the recognition of a parent-child privilege that 
would “bar compelled testimony concerning confidential communications 
made to [a] parent by his child in the course of seeking parental advice and 
guidance.”122  The Third Circuit’s reasoning also has not prevented other 
federal courts from recognizing a parent-child privilege,123 and it similarly 
fails to provide a compelling rationale for refusing to recognize a friendship 
privilege.124 
Indeed, the same argument that prompted the Third Circuit to decline to 
recognize a parent-child privilege has been made in opposition to the marital 
 
119. See Catherine Chiantella Stern, Note, Don’t Tell Mom the Babysitter’s Dead: Arguments for a 
Federal Parent-Child Privilege and a Proposal to Amend Article V, 99 GEO. L.J. 605, 622 (2011) (“With respect 
to the second factor [of the Wigmore test], which mandates that confidentiality must be essential to 
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties, many courts oversimplify 
the parent-child relationship and too easily dismiss the relevance of confidentiality to the maintenance 
of a strong parent-child relationship.”). 
120. See Israel v. Portland News Pub. Co., 53 P.2d 529, 532 (Or. 1936) (“It is common 
knowledge that people do not confide their short-comings except to their very closest friends and only 
to friends in whom they have the utmost confidence.”); cf. LILLIAN B. RUBIN, JUST FRIENDS: THE 
ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP IN OUR LIVES 22–23 (1985) (asserting that “friendships require a level of care 
and attention for their maintenance in ways that kin do not.”); Covey, supra note 37, at 897 n.149 
(asserting that “even the closest of friendships . . . may end at any time”).  See generally William S. Bailey, 
Flawed Justice: Limitation of Parental Remedies for the Loss of Consortium of Adult Children, 27 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 941, 955 (2004) (“While . . . social friendships may be transitory, the parent-child bond is 
remarkably durable, lasting a lifetime.”). 
121. For a comprehensive comparison of the conflicting opinions in the Grand Jury Proceedings 
case, see A. Shane Weldon, Comment, In re Grand Jury: Refusal of Federal Courts to Recognize a Parent-Child 
Testimonial Privilege, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 465, 480–95 (2004).  The author of that article observed 
that although “the parent-child relationship has survived to this point in time without a privilege, 
society continues to change, and . . . the parent-child relationship is in danger.”  Id. at 496. 
122. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d at 1165 (Mansmann, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
123. See Under Seal v. United States, 755 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Only a very small 
handful of federal district courts in this country have recognized the parent-child privilege.”). 
124. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 109, at 453 (“[T]rue friendship is based upon . . . 
personal disclosures and experiences. . . .  In other words, the quality of friendships is defined by the 
extent to which we trust each other with personal disclosures.”); cf. Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 729 n.261 (2009) (“I do not think saying that friendship can survive an 
occasional legal incursion actually undermines the idea that legal protection can usefully help friendship 
as an institution.”). 
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communications privilege,125 and yet, even if valid,126 it has had no 
discernible impact on that universally recognized privilege.127  One court 
explained this in the following terms:  
The argument traditionally advanced in support of the marital 
communications privilege is that the privilege is needed to encourage marital 
confidences, which confidences in turn promote harmony between husband 
and wife . . . .  Thus it must be assumed that spouses will know of the privilege 
and take its protection into account in determining to make marital 
confidences, or at least, which is not the same thing, that they would come to 
know of the absence of the privilege if it were withdrawn and be, as a result, 
less confiding than at present.128 
 
125. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court stated: 
An attorney, physician, or priest is in a position to elicit information by assuring the client, patient, 
or penitent of the confidential nature of the communications.  The existence of the privilege thus 
facilitates open communications to these professionals.  The notion that spouses are encouraged 
to communicate by reason of the privilege seems highly questionable. 
Glover v. State, 836 N.E.2d 414, 421 (Ind. 2005); see also Teri S. O’Brien, Comment, The Husband-Wife 
Evidentiary Privileges: Is Marriage Really Necessary?, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 428 (“Marriage encompasses 
the totality of a relationship between two individuals and is based on mutual trust and devotion.  It is 
unrealistic to assume that couples confide in one another because they are certain what they say will 
never be revealed in court.”). 
126. See generally Thomas J. Reed, The Futile Fifth Step: Compulsory Disclosure of Confidential 
Communications Among Alcoholics Anonymous Members, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693, 723 n.140 (1996) 
(quoting WIGMORE, supra note 20 § 2332, at 642). 
The only argument against recognition of the [husband-wife] privilege is based on the proposition 
that . . . the occasional compulsory disclosure in court of even the most intimate marital 
communications would not in fact affect to any perceptible degree the extent to which spouses 
share confidences.  Whether this argument is well founded is not, and probably cannot be, known. 
Id. 
127. See Maine v. Smith, 384 A.2d 687, 691 (Me. 1978) (“In the . . . typical case, no express 
invocation of confidentiality will occur; nevertheless, from the nature of the communication and the 
surrounding circumstances, it is apparent that the spouses assume that the communication is and will 
remain confidential.”); Franklin, supra note 67, at 168 (“The longevity of the marital privilege suggests 
that couples probably are aware, at least in a vague way, that marital confidences have legal 
protection.”); Sarson, supra note 99, at 864 (“Critics argue that . . . full disclosure between spouses 
results, not from the protection afforded by [a] privilege, but rather from the pre-existing trust inherent 
in the relationship . . . .  However, the spousal privilege has been maintained nonetheless . . . .  
[D]espite the fact that spouses may be unaware that the marital privilege exists, the confidentiality of 
[their] communication[s] is essential to the maintenance of the marital relationship.”). 
128. People v. Fisher, 503 N.W.2d 50, 58 (Mich. 1993) (quoting 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, 
EVIDENCE § 86, at 309–10 (4th ed. 1992)); see also Weldon, supra note 121, at 497 (“absence of the 
23
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Because cases in which parents and children are forced to testify against 
one another have begun to receive widespread public attention,129 many 
observers believe the recognition of a parent-child privilege would receive 
similar attention,130 and thereby influence the manner in which parents and 
children communicate with one another.131  The same presumably would 
be true of a friendship privilege.132  In this respect, the unsubstantiated 
 
marital privilege could promote a serious lack of open communication between spouses”).  Professor 
Thomas Krattenmaker dismissed the contention that “privileges should depend for their existence on 
an empirical finding, or hunch, that the communicants are expressly aware that their conversations are 
privileged.”  Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613, 653 (1976).  He asserted that “[s]uch an argument incorrectly 
assumes that subconscious, unarticulated knowledge never can influence human conduct” when there 
actually is “little reason to doubt that these privileges provide at the very least a subconscious backdrop 
to the exercise of the right of privacy.”  Id. at 653–54; cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d 1140, 
1160 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (Mansmann, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“While it is true . . . 
that few children are likely to be aware of a privilege per se, there is, in any event, a certain expectation 
that this information will not be disclosed.”). 
129. See, e.g., Ricafort, supra note 15, at 292 n.309 (asserting that the “absence of any parent-
child privilege became a matter of public and political outcry when Independent Counsel Kenneth 
Starr subpoenaed Monica Lewinsky’s mother to testify . . . .” during the Whitewater investigation 
(quoting Daniel J. Capra, Laws of Evidentiary Privilege, N.Y. LAW J., May 8, 1998, at 3, col.1)); see also 
Parent-Child Loyalty, supra note 26, at 922 (“Cases in which prosecutors attempt to compel parent-child 
testimony are widely reported by the media, and they make clear to parents and children that their 
relationships . . . are not protected by the law.”). 
130. See Franklin, supra note 67, at 168 (“If [the] courts recognize a parent-child privilege, it too 
will become known through its application.”); cf. Nora V. Demleitner, More Than “Just” Evidence: 
Reviewing Mirjan Damaska’s Evidence Law Adrift, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 515, 529 (1999) (referring to recent 
“increased publicity for those supporting parent-child testimonial immunity”).  The law’s failure to 
recognize a broadly applicable parent-child privilege may be attributable at least in part to the fact that 
until relatively recently “the average American probably did not think that courts could force people 
to testify against their parents or children.”  Shonah P. Jefferson, Note, The Statutory Development of the 
Parent-Child Privilege: Congress Responds to Kenneth Starr’s Tactics, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 430 (1999). 
131. See Brittany Libson, Note, Promoting Parental Guidance: An Argument for the Parent Child 
Privilege in Juvenile Adjudications, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137, 168 (2016) (“A statutory privilege would . . . 
promote open communication between children and parents by providing notice that the privilege 
exists and clear guidance on its application.”).  But cf. Susan Levine, Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: 
A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 787 (1979) (“[T]he child-parent privilege . . . even if known to 
those protected by it, will not appreciably increase communication in a family in which trust and 
openness do not already exist.”).  See generally Covey, supra note 37, at 899 (“Some observers question 
whether a testimonial privilege would actually affect family structures, yet any effect would likely be 
positive . . . .”’) (footnote omitted). 
132. See Leib, supra note 30, at 699 (describing the “Monica Lewinsky affair . . .” as a “highly 
publicized example where intimacies between friends were required to be exposed”).  See generally 
Levine, supra note 131, at 786 n.134 (“[I]t is likely that a greater percentage of the populace in today’s 
litigious society is aware of the existence of a privilege.”). 
24
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assertion that laypersons are generally unfamiliar with their privileges,133 
which appears to have provided one of the principal bases for the Third 
Circuit’s rejection of a parent-child privilege,134 provides a more compelling 
argument for informing the public of any newly recognized friendship 
privilege than it does for declining to recognize that privilege.135 
D. The Third Prong of the Test 
The third prong of the Wigmore test focuses on whether the relationship 
to be protected by the proposed privilege “is one which society should 
foster.”136  Addressing this question, the McMillen court indicated only that 
it could not say “the community seeks to sedulously foster friendships by 
recognizing friend-to-friend communications as confidential or 
privileged.”137  This tautological observation, which suggests the only 
relationships which should be protected by a testimonial privilege are those 
 
133. See Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1475 (“The simplest response to the claim that 
the average person knows little about her privileges is that the body of available data, scanty as it is, 
does not support such an assertion.”). 
134.  
[I]t is not clear whether children would be more likely to discuss private matters with their parents 
if a parent-child privilege were recognized than if one were not.  It is not likely that children, or 
even their parents, would typically be aware of the existence or non-existence of a testimonial 
privilege covering parent-child communications. 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3D 1140, 1152 (3d Cir. 1997); cf. State v. Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297, 
1302 (Wash. 1988) (“If recognized, such a privilege would probably not encourage parent-child 
communications if for no other reason than that it is unlikely many children would be aware of such a 
rule.”).  See generally David L. Cheatham, Comment, Kids Say the Darnedest Things: A Call for Adoption of a 
Statutory Parent-Child Confidential Communications Privilege in Response to Tougher Juvenile Sentencing Guidelines, 
8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 393, 398 n.32 (2002) (“Opponents of the parent-child privilege argue 
that . . . most parents and children are not aware of the privilege’s existence or non-existence . . . .  At 
least one proponent has conceded that perhaps the idea has ‘logical appeal . . . since the average layman 
presumably is not concerned with the law of evidence . . . .’” (quoting Betsy Booth, Comment, 
Underprivileged Communications: The Rationale for a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 36 SW. L.J. 1175, 1180 
(1983))). 
135. See Krattenmaker, supra note 128, at 653 (“[I]f we assume unawareness of a privilege, the 
more sensible response would be to favor wider dissemination of information concerning the privilege, 
not abolition of the underlying right.”). 
136. Maxon, 757 P.2d at 1302; see also Hercules, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 143 F.R.D. 266, 
269 (D. Utah 1992) (discussing Wigmore’s view that “only those privileges should be recognized which 
protect a relationship sedulously to be fostered”). 
137. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285, at *10 
(Pa. Ct. Com.Pl. Sept. 9, 2010). 
25
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that already are protected by such a privilege,138 is a mischaracterization of 
the Wigmore test,139 which was intended to establish the conditions under 
which new privileges should be recognized.140 
More fundamentally, the McMillen court’s observation ignores the 
evolutionary nature of American privilege law.141  At least in federal 
question cases (and in states that follow the federal model by leaving the 
recognition of privileges to common law development),142 courts “can and 
indeed should recognize new privileges when appropriate.”143  Even in 
states that do not follow the federal model,144 state legislatures (and perhaps 
 
138. See Flores v. Ardent Co., 95 Va. Cir. 368, 370 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2017) (“[T]rial courts have no 
authority to create a privilege where no such privilege otherwise exists.”); cf. Karl H. Schmid, Journalist’s 
Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United States Courts of Appeals’ Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 
39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1459–60 (2002) (“Wigmore believed there should be no evidentiary 
privileges, but certain evidentiary privileges already existed.  As a result, Wigmore argued that no new 
privileges should be created and the few existing privileges should be restricted or, at the very least, not 
broadened.”) (footnotes omitted). 
139. See Michael B. Bressman & Fernando R. Laguarda, Jaffee v. Redmond: Towards Recognition 
of a Federal Counselor-Battered Woman Privilege, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 319, 320 (1999) (“[S]ome 
privileges . . . have gained clear acceptance.  The question is whether other privileges should join their 
ranks.  In answering this question, courts typically consider the four criteria formulated by Dean 
Wigmore.”) (footnote omitted).  But see Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 428 (Alaska 1976) (Dimond, J., 
concurring) (“Professor Wigmore apparently developed his cannons to explain privileges then 
accepted.”). 
140. See Walker v. Huie, 142 F.R.D. 497, 500 (D. Utah 1992) (“Professor Wigmore . . . 
described four criteria which are useful in analyzing and determining whether [a] court should create a 
new evidentiary privilege . . . .”); In re Oct. 1985 Grand Jury No. 746, 530 N.E.2d 453, 459 (Ill. 1988) 
(Clark, J., dissenting) (referring to “the four conditions proposed by Dean Wigmore as necessary for 
the establishment or recognition of a new privilege”). 
141. See Agster v. Maricopa Cty., 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The law of privilege is not 
frozen.  The process of recognizing one is ‘evolutionary.’” (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 
(1996))); Peterson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360, 363 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (noting that 
“the common law privileges doctrine is fluid rather than static, and should reflect at least in part . . . 
evolving considerations of public policy”); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
142. See generally Babets v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Human Servs., 526 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 n.7 
(Mass. 1988) (“In at least ten other states, common law jurisdiction in this area has been expressly 
sanctioned by statute or rule of court.”). 
143. In re Application of United States, 936 F. Supp. 357, 359 (E.D. La. 1996); cf. Jenkins v. 
DeKalb Cty., 242 F.R.D. 652, 655 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“[T]he absence of controlling precedent is not 
immediately and necessarily fatal to [an] assertion of privilege.”). 
144. See, e.g., Marshall v. Anderson, 459 So. 2d 384, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (“[W]e are 
simply not empowered judicially to adopt any . . . privilege.  Directly unlike the federal courts . . . the 
courts of Florida are statutorily forbidden to do so.”); see also David A. Anderson, Confidential Sources 
Reconsidered, 61 FLA. L. REV. 883, 906 n.112 (2009) (“Federal courts have undoubted authority to 
develop common law evidentiary privileges.  In some states, courts are denied such authority except 
through the formal rule-making process for rules of evidence.”) (citation omitted). 
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even state courts)145 could adopt a friendship privilege as a matter of 
policy.146 
In fact, commentators have concluded that most proposed privileges 
satisfy the third prong of the Wigmore test.147  A friendship privilege should 
be no exception,148 as friendship has long been regarded as one of society’s 
most significant and valued relationships.149  Indeed, not only has 
friendship been a critical societal relationship in a historical sense,150 but it 
seems likely to become even more important as the socializing influence of 
 
145. See, e.g., Citizens Commc’ns Co. v. Att’y Gen., 931 A.2d 503, 506 (Me. 2007) (“We 
can . . . create new privileges pursuant to our rulemaking powers . . . .”’); see also Walstad v. State, 
818 P.2d 695, 697–98 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (noting that the psychotherapist-patient and clergy-
communicant privileges are “creatures of the [Alaska Supreme Court’s] procedural rulemaking 
authority”). 
146. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chauvin, 316 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Ky. 2010) (“Kentucky rules 
allow for the creation of statutory privileges.”); State v. Almonte, 644 A.2d 295, 300 (R.I. 1994) 
(Lederberg, J., dissenting) (“[T]his court, by adopting the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, has explicitly 
recognized the Legislature’s authority to create . . . privileges.”); see also State v. Harris, 755 P.2d 825, 
828 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (“The creation of a testimonial privilege is a recognized function of 
legislative power.”). 
147. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ausburn, Note, Circling the Wagons: Informational Privacy and Family 
Testimonial Privileges, 20 GA. L. REV. 173, 180 (1985) (“The third requirement is that the state should 
encourage the relationship.  If it were the only one, many human relationships would be protected.  
Most proposed privileges easily meet this requirement . . . .”) (footnote omitted); William Fullmer, 
Comment, Protecting an Independent Accountant’s Tax Accrual Workpapers from an Internal Revenue Service 
Summons, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 763 (1983) (asserting that “Wigmore’s third requirement is . . . quite 
easily satisfied”). 
148. See Kerr, supra note 40, at 4 (“[F]riendship is good for society, and so the law should work 
to facilitate the creation and continuity of friendships.  We don’t choose most of our family (or 
necessarily like them), but we hopefully like our friends.  It makes sense to encourage things people 
like.”); Jessica Feinberg, The Plus One Policy: An Autonomous Model of Family Reunification, 11 NEV. L.J. 
629, 659 (2011) (“[F]riendships contribute to people’s emotional health and well-being . . . .  In turn, 
emotionally healthy people have greater productivity and contribute more to society.”). 
149. See Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Md. 1973) (“As social animals, 
individuals necessarily place importance on friendships and relationships of trust.  Hence the 
development of a right of privacy.”), aff’d, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974); Perry Dane, A Holy Secular 
Institution, 58 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1183 n.165 (2009) (discussing “the elevated place of friendship in 
society’s moral and symbolic imagination”); Melissa Bianca Kendall, Friendship: The Forgotten Relationship 
in the Rehabilitation Environment, 1 EDORIUM J. DISABILITY & REHABILITATION 12, 12 (2015) 
(“Friendship has been viewed as one of the most important of all relationships because friends help us 
understand the purpose of life.”). 
150. See generally Kerr, supra note 40, at 3 (“Friendship provides us a space for autonomy and 
control, where we can nurture nascent ideas and feelings.”); Gelzinis, supra note 31, at 548 (“Friendship 
is a most-basic human relationship that allows us to live better lives, and it deserves careful 
consideration.”). 
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the family declines151 and society itself continues to evolve.152  As one 
commentator observed: 
Society has an interest in fostering and preserving friendships.  Indeed, society 
should have an interest in ensuring that everyone has someone they can 
confide in . . . .  That citizens have confidants, whether that person is a spouse, 
family member, friend, clergy member, psychotherapist, or, say, bartender, 
would appear to benefit us all.153 
E. The Fourth Prong of the Test 
The fourth prong of the Wigmore test involves balancing the potential 
benefit the disclosure of confidential communications may have on the 
administration of justice against the harm such disclosure might have on the 
relationship that would be protected by the privilege under 
consideration.154  Because this aspect of the test involves the weighing of 
competing interests that militate “both for and against disclosure,”155 it 
 
151. See Feinberg, supra note 148, at 658 (“[I]t is friends, not family members, upon whom 
people increasingly rely for emotional intimacy and guidance.”); MARILYN FRIEDMAN, WHAT ARE 
FRIENDS FOR? 187 (1993) (“In a time of widespread decline in the role of extended kinship networks 
and pitched battles over the role of sexual relationships in our lives, friendship may emerge, in our 
culture, as the least contested, most enduring, and most satisfying of all close personal affiliations.”); 
Angela Mae Kupenda, Two Parents Are Better Than None: Whether Two Single, African American Adults—
Who Are Not in a Traditional Marriage or a Romantic or Sexual Relationship with Each Other—Should Be Allowed 
to Jointly Adopt and Co-Parent African American Children, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 703, 717 (1996) 
(“Given the present high divorce rates, a . . . friend/friend relationship might indeed be more lasting 
and more stable than many marriages.”); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
189, 212 (2007) (“[F]riendship increasingly serves many of the functions traditionally reserved for 
family . . . .”). 
152. See generally Feinberg, supra note 148, at 657 (“Scholars refer to friendship as ‘a relationship 
of increasing social significance in the contemporary world.’” (quoting Sasha Roseneil, Why We Should 
Care About Friends: An Argument for Queering the Care Imaginary in Social Policy, SOC. POL’Y & SOC’Y, Oct. 
2004, at 409, 411)); Rosenbury, supra note 151, at 209 (“friendship is an increasingly important aspect 
of many people’s lives”). 
153. I. Bennett Capers, Enron, DOMA, and Spousal Privileges: Rethinking the Marriage Plot, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 726 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
154. See In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Wigmore’s fourth condition recognizes 
the balancing which must be done when an asserted privilege contravenes a principle fundamental to 
the fair administration of justice—that the public has a right to everyone’s evidence.”); Garner v. 
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that Wigmore’s fourth condition involves 
“a balancing of interests between injury resulting from disclosure and the benefit gained in the correct 
disposal of litigation”). 
155. Hanson v. Rowe, 500 P.2d 916, 919 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); cf. SEC v. Touche Ross & Co., 
438 F. Supp. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“[A] value judgment must be made as to whether creating a 
28
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presents the courts with the most analytical difficulty.156  Not surprisingly, 
it is also the issue upon which courts contemplating the recognition of new 
privileges almost invariably focus.157   
1. A Friendship Privilege May Impede Truth-Seeking 
The McMillen court concluded that this aspect of the test was not satisfied 
under the facts of that case,158 noting that access to the plaintiff’s private 
posts on Facebook “could help to prove either the truth or falsity” of his 
allegations.159  Conversely, the court asserted that because a social media 
user generally “knows that even if he attempts to communicate privately, his 
posts may be shared with strangers as a result of his friends’ selected privacy 
settings,”160 there would be little or no detriment to social media 
friendships in allowing “other strangers, i.e., litigants, [to] become privy to 
those communications through discovery.”161  In summary, the court 
struck the balance of interests contemplated under the Wigmore test in 
favor of disclosure in the social media context: 
 
new privilege . . . would serve the public better than adherence to our basic premise that courts . . . are 
entitled to every man’s evidence.”). 
156. See, e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (D. Nev. 1983) (“The fourth component of 
Wigmore’s test presents a more difficult problem in analysis . . . .”); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
(Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 1010 (D.N.J.) (“This court recognizes that the 
balance it strikes depends heavily on its own normative predilections, especially given the absence of 
reliable empirical evidence on the subject.”) (contemplating the recognition of a psychotherapist-
patient privilege), aff’d, 879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989). 
157. See Thomas J. Molony, Note, Is the Supreme Court Ready to Recognize Another Privilege? An 
Examination of the Accountant-Client Privilege in the Aftermath of Jaffee v. Redmond, 55 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 247, 260–61 (1998) (asserting that “in any privilege debate, the fourth condition [is] the [expected] 
battleground”). 
158. See McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285, 
at *11 (Pa. Ct. Com.Pl. Sept. 9, 2010) (“[W]hatever relational harm may be realized by social network 
computer site users is undoubtedly outweighed by the benefit of correctly disposing of litigation.”). 
159. Id. at *11–12. 
160. Id. at *11; see, e.g. Chaney v. Fayette Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1313 (N.D. 
Ga. 2013) (describing an individual who “permitted access to her Facebook page using a semi-private 
setting that allowed her Facebook ‘friends’ and ‘friends of friends’ to view her page”); see also Xiajing 
Li, Note, Should Posts on Social Networking Websites be Considered “Printed Publications” Under Patent Law, 
2011 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 3, 27 (“[E]ven if users disclose information to a small number 
of close friends on these sites, the information may be disseminated to an unlimited group of people 
if just one ‘friend’ choose[s] a less private setting.”). 
161. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *11; cf. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers & Confidentiality, 65 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 n.50 (1998) (“That close friends . . . can be compelled to disclose information . . . 
may deter initial communications, but the law presumes that the gains from disclosure by such 
confidants outweigh this effect.”). 
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Millions of people join Facebook, MySpace, and other social network sites, 
and as various news accounts have attested, more than a few use those sites 
indiscreetly . . . .  When they do and their indiscretions are pertinent to issues 
raised in a lawsuit in which they have been named, the search for truth should 
prevail to [bring] to light relevant information that may not otherwise have 
been known.162 
This reasoning is not entirely persuasive,163 and in any event, has little or 
no application to traditional friendships.164  The McMillen plaintiff’s 
communications with his friends on social media certainly may have 
contained information relevant to his case.165  To that extent, the court’s 
recognition of a friendship privilege protecting those communications 
might well have “frustrate[d], to a degree, the discovery of truth and 
consequently the meting out of justice.”166 
However, this possibility provides no basis for refusing to recognize a 
friendship privilege.167  Evidence protected by any testimonial privilege is 
at least presumptively relevant,168 as “the very nature of a privilege is that 
 
162. McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *12. 
163. See Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. 
L. REV. BRIEF 1, 8 (2011) (“We tell our Facebook ‘friends’ secrets we once would have shared with 
only a few close friends . . . .”); cf. Robert P. Mosteller, Admissibility of Fruits of Breached Evidentiary 
Privileges: The Importance of Adversarial Fairness, Party Culpability, and Fear of Immunity, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 
961, 974 (2003) (“[T]he concept that once [a] confidence is disclosed the privilege has no remaining 
legitimate function to perform, is inconsistent with sound policy . . . .” (citing 1 CHARLES T. 
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 93, at 372–73 (5th ed. 1999))). 
164. See generally Kerr, supra note 40 at 3 (“Friends are our confidants, the keepers of our secrets 
in a more omnisciently public space—gossip with friends is our personal catharsis, a veritable piece de 
resistance against the saturation of Facebook and Tumblr.”). 
165. See, e.g., Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 116 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he relevance of a posting reflecting engagement in a physical activity that would 
not be feasible given the plaintiff’s claimed physical injury is obvious . . . .”); see also Gordon v. T.G.R. 
Logistics, Inc., 321 F.R.D. 401, 403 (D. Wyo. 2017) (“[I]t is conceivable that almost any post to social 
media will provide some relevant information concerning a person’s physical and/or emotional 
health . . . .”). 
166. Schoeman, supra note 33, at 258; cf. Int’l Union, UAW v. Honeywell, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 323, 
328 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“[T]he cost of any privilege is the possibility that cases will be decided on 
less than all of the relevant information known to the parties . . . .”). 
167. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 864 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“Relevance is not the standard for determining whether or not evidence should be protected from 
disclosure as privileged, and that remains the case even if one might conclude the facts to be disclosed 
are vital, highly probative, directly relevant or even go to the heart of an issue.”). 
168. See In re Cty. of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[P]rivileged information may be in 
some sense relevant in any lawsuit.”); United States v. Zouras, 497 F.2d 1115, 1119–20 (7th Cir. 1974) 
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it prevents disclosure of information that may be relevant in the case, in 
order to serve interests that are of over-arching importance.”169  Indeed, 
the attorney-client and marital communications privileges both may impede 
the search for truth,170 and yet that fact has not prevented the perpetuation 
of those two universally recognized privileges.171 
In addition, individuals who share confidential information with friends 
assume some risk that those friends will betray their confidences,172 just as 
individuals who share information on social media risk the disclosure of that 
information to persons other than the intended recipients.173  This 
 
(“[E]vidence excluded by any privilege, is excluded not because the evidence is not relevant—by 
hypothesis it is—but because of independent policy justifications.”). 
169. Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1999); see also United States v. 
Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating “all privileges limit access to the truth in aid of 
other objectives” (citing WIGMORE, supra note 20 § 2291, at 527)); R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 
842 (Tex. 1994) (“[R]elevance alone cannot be the test, because such a test would ignore the 
fundamental purpose of evidentiary privileges, which is to preclude discovery and admission of relevant 
evidence under prescribed circumstances.”). 
170. See United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 2001) (“One privilege that is firmly 
rooted in our common law is the marital communications privilege, which reflects the value our society 
places on uninhibited communications between spouses. . . .  Yet, the cost of the privilege is a 
reduction in truthful disclosure.”); United States v. Sabri, 973 F. Supp. 134, 140 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(noting “the attorney–client privilege, like all other evidentiary privileges, impinges on the production 
of relevant evidence, and thus functions as an obstacle to the fact-finder in the pursuit of truth”). 
171. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 296 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. 1980) (“The basic reason for enforcing 
the marital communications privilege is that the injury that would result to the marital relationship by 
disclosure of confidential communications outweighs the benefit conveyed by disclosure to the judicial 
investigation of truth.”); see also Brunton v. Kruger, 32 N.E.3d 567, 578 (Ill. 2015) (“The existence of a 
statutory privilege of any kind necessarily means that the legislature has determined that public policy 
trumps the truth-seeking function of litigation in certain circumstances.”). 
172. See, e.g., Pawloski v. State, 380 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind. 1978) (discussing an individual who 
“felt compelled to come forward with information which might be of assistance to the police even 
though it acted to incriminate and betray the confidence of a friend”); see also Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 
1185, 1217–18 (Cal. 2007) (noting a person who shares confidential information with a relative or 
friend “assumes the risk . . . that the relative or friend may betray his or her confidence”); State v. 
Reeves, 427 So. 2d 403, 409 (La. 1982) (discussing “the known risk we all take that a false friend might 
betray our trust by revealing the contents of our conversation to others . . . .”); Nader v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970) (noting an individual “would necessarily assume the risk that 
a friend or acquaintance in whom he had confided might breach the confidence”); State v. Woods, 
361 N.W.2d 620, 621 (S.D. 1985) (discussing “the risk that even a trusted friend will repeat or allow 
others to hear what you have said”). 
173. See Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not 
Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 62–63 (2013) (“Individuals on Facebook—like their offline counterparts—
assume the risk that one or more of their Facebook friends may betray their trust and reveal their 
communication. . . .  We must be wary before communicating confidential information to a Facebook 
friend in the same way we must be cautious before revealing information to another individual in a 
face-to-face interaction.”). 
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possibility may even have contributed to the prevailing view that such 
communications should be admissible in subsequent judicial 
proceedings.174  Nevertheless, “we should not succumb to the assumption 
that, because we tell a friend who might betray our confidence, we cannot 
reasonably expect any privacy in the conversation.”175  Indeed, a similar 
risk of betrayal inheres in the relationship between spouses176 (and, for that 
matter, any other confidential relationship),177 and yet the marital 
communications privilege and many other testimonial privileges have 




174. See State v. Duarte, 484 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (indicating “a conversation 
with a friend is admissible upon the theory of misplaced confidence”); cf. Conquest v. Mitchell, 
618 F.2d 1053, 1057 (4th Cir. 1980) (Haynsworth, C.J., concurring) (stating an individual “is free to 
confide in a friend if he wishes [but] must suffer the consequences if the friend later betrays the 
confidence”). 
175. State v. Brooks, 601 A.2d 963, 967 (Vt. 1991) (Morse, J., dissenting); see also Taus, 151 P.3d 
at 1218 (“[T]here is no reason to conclude that [a] person does not retain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy that may be violated when a third party . . . gains unauthorized and unwanted access to such 
[confidential] information from . . . [the person’s] relative or friend.”). 
176. See Steven Goode & M. Michael Sharlot, Article V: Privileges, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 489, 544 
(1993) (“[A] married person must recognize that no guarantee exists to ensure that his or her 
confidences will not, by inadvertence or malice, be divulged to any and all.  Intimate marital 
communications . . . are inevitably at risk of disclosure to the other spouse’s relatives, workmates, and 
friends . . . .”). 
177. See Ribas v. Clark, 696 P.2d 637, 640 (Cal. 1985) (“[O]ne who imparts private information 
risks the betrayal of his confidence by the other party . . . .”); Warden v. Kahn, 160 Cal. Rptr. 471, 476 
(Ct. App. 1979) (noting “a person participating in what he reasonably believes to be a confidential 
communication bears the risk that the other party will betray his confidence”); Bedi, supra note 173, 
at 63 (asserting the risk of betrayal “is inherent in any relationship”); David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale 
for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1113 (1986) (“[W]hoever makes any 
information available to another person automatically and unavoidably assumes the risk of further 
disclosure.  To share a confidence is to assume the risk of betrayal.”). 
178. See, e.g., State v. Holmes, 412 S.E.2d 660, 661 (N.C. 1992) (“The common law has long 
recognized a privilege protecting confidential marital communications, that is, information privately 
disclosed between a husband and wife in the confidence of the marital relationship.”); see also Keshecki 
v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 785 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (“The physician–patient 
confidentiality privilege has been codified for over [175] years.”). 
179. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Minn. 1979) (“The attorney–client 
privilege, which was codified in Minnesota in 1851, . . . has been universally accepted since the 19th 
Century as indispensable to an attorney’s professional relationship with his client.”) see also Alt v. Cline, 
589 N.W.2d 21, 33 (Wis. 1999) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“The creation and modification of the ‘great’ 
privileges spans the course of centuries. . . .  [T]he attorney–client privilege dates back almost to the 
time of Shakespeare when testimony at trial first came into practice.  The ‘modern’ spousal privilege 
came into existence in the middle part of the nineteenth century.”) (citations omitted). 
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analysis should apply to the relationship between friends.180 
In short, the argument that the recognition of a friendship privilege would 
prevent the discovery and introduction of relevant evidence, and thus 
impede the judiciary’s fundamental search for truth, is a relatively weak 
one.181  Professor Sanford Levinson, who is one of the few scholars to 
explore the merits of a friendship privilege,182 criticized the argument in the 
following terms: 
All testimonial privileges block the State from compelling the disclosure of 
information that would presumably aid it in achieving knowledge of the truth 
about matters of public importance.  Such failures of disclosure may also, of 
course, lead to injustice.  Nonetheless, privileges are among the most 
important markers our society offers to adumbrate that there are more 
important values than truth and justice.183 
 
180. See Carly Brandenburg, Note, The Newest Way to Screen Job Applicants: A Social Networker’s 
Nightmare, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 597, 605 n.30 (2008) (“[W]hether the information one shares is with a 
doctor or lawyer (legally protected and private relationships) or with friends or acquaintances who are 
under no specific legal obligation to maintain the confidences shared with them is not determinative 
of whether the person can have an expectation of privacy.”). 
181. See Raymond C. Ruppert, Note, The Accountant-Client Privilege Under the New Federal Rules of 
Evidence—New Stature and New Problems, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 637, 647–48 (1975) (“The . . . argument 
against [a] privilege—that privileges are an exception to the court’s right to know all the relevant 
facts— . . . can be made against all privilege laws.  Yet privilege laws exist because the law recognizes 
that some communications must be made in the aura of confidentiality.”). 
182. Unlike other academics such as Ethan Leib, Levinson has not focused his scholarship on 
the study of friendship.  Cf. Kerr, supra note 40 at 4 (“Ethan Leib of Fordham is the representative—
and most elegant—voice in law today for the reconstitution of ‘friendship law’ as part of the scholarly 
discourse.”); Agee, supra note 106 at 373 (describing Leib as “a leading scholar on friendship’s role in 
the law”).  Levinson instead is “among our generation’s foremost constitutional scholars.”  Richard H. 
Weisberg, Levinson Is to Mr. Justice “Isaiah” as St. Paul Was to the Prophet Isaiah, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 925, 935 
(2011); see also Charles H. Hooker, Comment, The Past as Prologue: Schneiderman v. United States and 
Contemporary Questions of Citizenship and Denationalization, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 305, 316 n.45 (2005) 
(“Sanford Levinson is an internationally renowned scholar of constitutional law.”).  In his article 
exploring the merits of a friendship privilege, which is discussed in more detail in Sections IV and VI, 
infra, Levinson did not purport to be expounding a “constitutional theory,” although he did 
acknowledge the “constitutional dimension of the protection of intimacy.”  Levinson, supra note 29 
at 636 & n.18. 
183. Levinson, supra note 29 at 637; see also Int’l Union, UAW v. Honeywell, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 
323, 328 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“[T]ruth-seeking is not the only interest or principle at stake in litigation; 
if it was, there would be no need for any privileges, the very purpose of which is to protect against the 
disclosure of information notwithstanding its relevance.”); Jackson v. Dendy, 638 So. 2d 1182, 1186 
(La. Ct. App. 1994) (“When privileges exist, miscarriages of justice will occur.  But the relationship that 
is protected, on the whole, outweighs some of the individually incorrect results.” (quoting David V. 
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2. A Friendship Privilege Occasionally May Further the Search for 
Truth 
Many individuals who are asked (or ordered)184 to provide testimony 
against their friends presumably will be reluctant to do so185 and may refuse 
to testify186 despite the risk of being held in “contempt of court”187 if they 
pursue that course of action.188  There likewise is no guarantee that those 
who agree to testify will do so truthfully,189 despite the risk of a perjury 
 
Snyder, Comment, Disclosure of Medical Information Under Louisiana and Federal Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 169, 
201 (1990))). 
184. See generally United States v. Lockwood, 386 F. Supp. 734, 738 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“[T]he 
absence of . . . privilege should not be construed as a prosecutorial imperative to place . . . friends in 
such a difficult and conscience-taxing position.  The essence of justice includes not only an adherence 
to legal rules, but an element of compassion.”) (citation omitted). 
185. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 282 F.3d 597, 602 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Most witnesses called 
to testify before the grand jury about friends . . . likely are apprehensive about providing incriminating 
evidence against those they care about.”).  But see Carr v. United States, 531 A.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (“Friends testify against other friends.”). 
186. See, e.g., Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 167 n.50 (D. Mass. 2007) (discussing 
a witness who “refused to testify against his friend”); People v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 362, 365 (Mich. Ct. 
App.) (“Although numerous witnesses testified at trial, the only eyewitness was a friend of 
defendant’s . . . who refused to testify about defendant’s involvement in the shooting, stating that he 
did not want to incriminate defendant and their mutual friends.”), leave to appeal denied, 721 N.W.2d 215 
(Mich. 2006); see also Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Culture Matters: Cultural Differences in the Reporting of 
Employment Discrimination Claims, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 405, 440–41 (2011) (referring to the 
hypothetical friend “who places greater value on his friendship than the law by choosing not to testify 
against his friend”). 
187. See Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1174 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting absent a claim of 
privilege “a witness may be held in contempt of court for refusing to testify”).  A finding of contempt 
“is a tool used by courts to compel compliance with their orders.”  Puchner v. Kruzicki, 111 F.3d 541, 
543 (7th Cir. 1997).  In this context it typically involves the court-ordered incarceration of a witness 
who has refused to comply with an order to testify.  See, e.g., United States v. Nightingale, 703 F.2d 17, 
19 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[R]efusal to testify before a grand jury is usually remedied by a civil contempt order 
incarcerating the adamant witness for the life of the grand jury or until the testimony is forthcoming.”).  
The incarceration ends if the witness relents and agrees to testify.  See United States v. Index 
Newspapers LLC, 766 F.3d 1072, 1089 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Civil contempt is designed to coerce a 
witness’s testimony and confinement must end if the contemnor complies.”). 
188. See State v. Cherry, 674 A.2d 589, 595 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995) (describing a witness who 
“was held in contempt because he refused to testify against . . . his friend”); see also Schoeman, supra 
note 33, at 267 (“[P]ersons who feel conscious-bound not to reveal in court what a friend in confidence 
has related [could] plead conscientious refusal and hope that the presiding judge will show leniency 
when finding the witness in contempt.”). 
189. See Culbreath Isles Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 151 F. Supp. 
3d 1282, 1287 n.29 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (discussing a witness’s testimony that was “colored by her loyalty 
and devotion to her life-long friend”), aff’d sub nom., Sidman v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 841 F.3d 1197 
(11th Cir. 2016); State v. Deese, 225 S.E.2d 175, 176 (S.C. 1976) (describing a witness who “testified 
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conviction for providing untruthful testimony.190  As Professor Levinson 
explained, the “moral obligations of friendship” may cause a witness to 
“refuse to betray [a] secret, either by committing perjury or even by a 
willingness to go to jail for contempt of court.”191 
Perjured testimony undermines the truth-seeking process192 “by creating 
a false picture of the evidence before the trier of fact.”193  A witness’s 
refusal to testify, with or without the protection of a testimonial privilege,194 
may have the same effect.195  For those reasons, any benefit to the 
administration of justice to be derived from refusing to recognize a 
 
falsely under oath to protect a friend”); see also United States v. Vecchiarello, 569 F.2d 656, 659 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (noting “a witness . . . may desire to testify falsely to support a friend”). 
190. See People v. Martinez, 377 N.E.2d 1222, 1226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (describing a 
prosecution witness who “had given perjured testimony because of his friendship for defendant”); see 
also Catz & Lange, supra note 34 at 111 n.117 (“When a party’s best friend is called to the stand by the 
opposing party, problems are bound to arise. . . .  The temptation to perjury is obvious.”).  See generally 
Catletti v. Cty of Orange, 207 F. Supp. 2d 225, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“A witness testifies under the risk 
of prosecution for perjury should he or she give false or misleading information.”), aff’d sub nom., Catletti 
v. Rampe, 334 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2003). 
191. Levinson, supra note 29 at 659; see also Fischel, supra note 161 at 2 (“Friends . . . learn 
private information, frequently with the express or implied understanding that the information will be 
kept confidential.  No doubt [they] also face the occasional dilemma of whether to maintain 
confidentiality or to disclose the information . . . .  And regardless of what [they] would do voluntarily, 
they are subject to compelled disclosure by subpoena and face civil or criminal penalties if they 
refuse.”). 
192. See Price v. Time, Inc., 425 F.3d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting “the search for truth 
is led astray by perjury”); SEC v. Payton, 176 F. Supp. 3d 346, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (discussing “the 
perversion by possible perjury of a court proceeding’s truth-finding function”); Jones v. Lincoln Elec. 
Co., 990 F. Supp. 1093, 1095 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (“Of course, an essential function of a trial is truth-
finding, and false testimony can impede that function.”), aff’d, 188 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Pisani, 590 F. Supp. 1326, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating “perjury . . . impedes the truthseeking 
function of the tribunal”). 
193. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 516 (Cal. 1998); see also Long v. 
Pfister, 874 F.3d 544, 555 (7th Cir. 2017) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“A jury that hears evidence merely 
contradicting . . . perjury cannot be said to know the truth.”). 
194. See United States v. Bibbins, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1202 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (noting a party 
ordered to testify or produce evidence despite asserting a claim of privilege “may choose non-
compliance over production”). 
195. See Howard v. United States, 182 F.2d 908, 912 (8th Cir.) (noting witnesses can “obstruct 
or interfere with the administration of justice by refusing to testify, by testifying falsely, or by 
suppressing the truth”), vacated as moot, 340 U.S. 898 (1950); Covey, supra note 37 at 895 (“The witness 
can either testify truthfully, refuse to testify and risk being held in contempt, or lie under oath and 
commit perjury.  The latter two alternatives directly interfere with the truth-seeking function of the 
court.”) (footnote omitted). 
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friendship privilege may be negligible.196  As one commentator observed, 
“just as the assertion of [a] privilege impedes the search for truth, so too 
does perjury. . . .  The difference is that the assertion of a privilege is a means 
of impeding the search for truth in a lawful manner, while perjury is an 
unlawful effort to the same end.”197 
In fact, by protecting “the friend in whom one has confided from possibly 
having to face the moral predicament of betraying a confidence, perjuring 
himself, [or] going to prison for contempt,”198 the recognition of a 
friendship privilege actually might further the search for truth by eliminating 
his incentive to commit perjury.199  This suggests that the balancing of 
 
196. See Allred v. Alaska, 554 P.2d 411, 429 (Alaska 1976) (Dimond, J., concurring) (asserting 
“the truth-finding function of the courts would not be advanced by nonrecognition of [a] privilege” if 
compelling the witness to testify would not be “effective in breaching . . . existing confidentiality”); 
Pratt v. Payne, 794 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ohio Ct. App.) (“[E]ven if witnesses are compelled to testify, 
they may still commit perjury or distort the truth”), leave to appeal denied, 798 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio 2003); 
Covey, supra note 37 at 896 n.142 (observing compelled testimony may be “so unreliable that the 
interests of adjudication are not furthered”). 
197. Paul Rosenzweig, Truth, Privileges, Perjury, and the Criminal Law, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 153, 
165 (2002); cf. William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 1942 
(1993) (asserting testimonial privileges represent “a practical preference for silence over perjury”). 
198. Schoeman, supra note 33, at 268; see United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 
1991) (describing an individual who “was, as the saying goes, between a rock and a hard place” because 
he “could refuse to cooperate with the authorities and risk going to jail himself, or he could betray his 
friend, help the government, and stay out of jail”).  In other contexts, this “moral predicament” has 
been referred to as a “cruel trilemma.”  Butterfield v. State, 992 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1999) (citing Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 404 (1990)); see United States v. Mitchell, No. 08-
CR-46-LRR, 2009 WL 103610, at 3 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 15, 2009) (“The adverse spousal testimony 
privilege shields the witness-spouse from ‘the ‘cruel trilemma’ of perjury, contempt, or betrayal of the 
[defendant-spouse.]” (quoting GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
§ 9.4, at 450 n.15 (3d ed. 1996))) (bracketing omitted); Libson, supra note 131 at 166 (“[W]hen parents 
are subpoenaed to testify against their children, they face what has been referred to as the ‘cruel 
trilemma,’ where parents face three options: (1) betray their children by testifying truthfully; (2) refuse 
to testify and be held in contempt of court, facing possible imprisonment; or (3) testify falsely, 
committing perjury.”). 
199. Cf. State v. Wood, 758 P.2d 530, 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (“The marital privileges . . . 
were designed to avoid forcing the witness spouse to choose between perjury, contempt of court, or 
jeopardizing the marriage.”).  See generally Rancho Publ’ns v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274, 
280 n.6 (Ct. App. 1999) (“[P]rivileges may promote truth seeking by avoiding conflicts of interest that 
could lead to perjury.” (citing David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in 
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 114–15 (1956))); Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child 
Privileges: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 614 (1987) (suggesting 
“privileges actually aid the ascertainment of truth by eliminating those situations in which perjured 
testimony is more likely”). 
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interests required by the fourth prong of the Wigmore test may favor 
recognition of the privilege.200  As one court observed: 
[I]f a . . . privilege is foreclosed, the truth may yet remain elusive and even just 
as unobtainable, in light of the perjury which could take place if such 
testimony is coerced.  [¶]  In explaining Wigmore’s fourth criterion for the 
recognition of a testimonial privilege, then, the expected benefit to justice, 
used as a rationale for a bar of the privilege, is perhaps illusory.201 
V.    SOME SCHOLARS SUPPORT THE RECOGNITION OF A 
FRIENDSHIP PRIVILEGE 
In one of the few scholarly articles considering the merits of a friendship 
privilege,202 Professor Ferdinand Schoeman concluded that the protection 
enjoyed by spouses under the marital communications privilege should 
extend by analogy to “intimate friendship between persons not married to 
one another.”203  While acknowledging that Wigmore himself might have 
opposed any such extension of the marital communications privilege,204 
Schoeman maintained that it is nevertheless possible to use Wigmore’s 
criteria “as the basis for such an extension.”205 
 
200. See Amanda H. Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A Witness-Centered Rationale, 14 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 42 (1999) (“If silence should be immunized whenever witnesses are under great 
pressure to commit perjury, then friends . . . should . . . be exempted from the obligation to testify 
against each other.”). 
201. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1310 (D. Nev. 1983) (recognizing a parent-child privilege).  
But see State v. Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297, 1303 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (“[B]asing recognition of an 
evidentiary privilege on the refusal of some witnesses to testify or on a fear of perjury is . . . unsound” 
precisely because doing so “would necessitate granting privileges to . . . distant relatives and even to 
friends . . . .”). 
202. See Schoeman, supra note 33, at 269 (“Legal recognition of a communication privilege 
between friends seems to me to have the potential consequence of enhancing public recognition of the 
value of friendship.  Friendship would then become a recognizable relationship within public morality 
and public consciousness.”). 
203. Id. at 268; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1590 (asserting the marital 
privilege “should extend beyond legally recognized marriages to . . . the parent-child and other familial 
relationships, as well as relationships between . . . friends”). 
204. See Schoeman, supra note 33, at 262 (“Wigmore would have rejected proposals to broaden 
the scope of the privilege of confidential communication . . . .”); cf. United States v. Jaskiewicz, 278 F. 
Supp. 525, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (noting “Professor Wigmore . . . cautioned against the expansion of 
privileges”). 
205.    Schoeman, supra note 33, at 262. 
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Schoeman is not alone in suggesting that a friendship privilege would 
satisfy the Wigmore test.206  One student commentator made the point in 
the following terms: 
[P]ersonal friendship . . . would, to some degree, seem to meet the four 
Wigmore criteria.  These communications originate in confidence essential to 
the satisfactory maintenance of the relationship.  These relationships are 
favored by most groups within the society and would be irreparably damaged 
by disclosure.  If taken seriously, therefore, Wigmore’s criteria would invite 
[recognition] of the privilege.207 
In refusing to recognize a friendship privilege in the social media 
context,208 the court in McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc.209 not only 
ignored (or at least overlooked)210 the analysis in these articles211 but 
another thoughtful article in which Professor Sanford Levinson argued that 
the Wigmore test is not even the appropriate formulation for determining 
whether a friendship privilege should be recognized.212  Levinson, who 
 
206. See Covey, supra note 37 at 881 n.20 (“[S]ome argue that relationships between close 
friends . . . might . . . qualify for privilege status under the Wigmore test.”); Functional Overlap, supra 
note 86, at 1230 (asserting “relationships ranging from personal friendship to psychiatrist and patient 
. . . seem to meet the four Wigmore criteria”). 
207. Functional Overlap, supra note 86, at 1230. 
208. See Hoy v. Holmes, 28 Pa. D. & C. 5th 9, 13 (Ct. C.P. 2013) (citing McMillen for the 
proposition that there is “no privilege between friends on [a] social media account”). 
209. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285, (Pa. Ct. 
Com.Pl. Sept. 9, 2010). 
210. The courts’ authority to recognize and develop new common law privileges encompasses 
the authority “to consult treatises and commentaries on the law of evidence.”  In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 379 (3d Cir. 1990); see also In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 
1983) (suggesting courts consider “scholarly opinion . . . in considering [a] claim of . . . privilege”). 
211. See, e.g., Schoeman, supra note 33, at 265 (“Friendship, though not presently recognized as 
entailing a legal relationship, surely does capture many of the social and moral aspects, the inner 
sharings, that marriage is presumed to have.  In fact, by definition these qualities are present in intimate 
friendships.”); cf. Gelzinis supra note 31, at 547 (“Why are judges and policymakers so preoccupied with 
the institution of marriage, when the same kinds of personal and communal benefits can flow from 
friendship, which has been ignored by the law?”). 
212. See Levinson, supra note 29 at 642–43 (asserting the Wigmore test “is not a conception that 
takes right seriously,” and applauding the fact that “recent scholarly analysis of testimonial privileges 
[instead] has emphasized the notion of ‘privacy’”); cf. Kerry L. Morse, Note, A Uniform Testimonial 
Privilege for Mental Health Professionals, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 741, 744 (1990) (noting scholars who deem the 
protection of individual privacy to be a more compelling rationale for the existence of testimonial 
privileges maintain “certain communications should be protected by a privilege, without considering 
any greater benefit to society”).  See generally United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 
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characterized friendship as a value “eminently worth protecting,”213 
objected to the Wigmore test primarily because its application enables 
individuals to enjoy “only those privileges that the society itself deems 
desirable in order to attain broad social goals,”214 and thus occasionally may 
force them “to choose between the demands of friendship and those of the 
wider society.”215 
Levinson concluded that the deficiencies in the Wigmore test,216 which 
some jurists have also noted,217 has resulted in an unfortunate “capitulation 
 
1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussing the “increasing pressures for the creation of entirely new 
privileges . . . predicated upon expanding concepts of privacy”), aff’d, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977). 
213. Levinson, supra note 29 at 641.  Levinson has stated elsewhere that his own life has been 
“immeasurably aided by friendships.”  Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on Multiculturalism, “Equal 
Concern and Respect,” and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 989, 994 
(1993). 
214. Levinson, supra note 29 at 643.  Schoeman also implicitly criticized the Wigmore test.  See 
Schoeman, supra note 33, at 263 (“The integrity of [intimate] relationships presupposes people’s 
recognition of the legitimacy of relationships whose value is independent of the values of others or of the values 
of the culture generally.  Relationships between people must exist for the sake of one another.”) (emphasis 
added).  Schoeman proceeded to explain his view of the issue in the following terms: 
It seems to me to be a mistake of the first order to think that the extent to which we should give 
social and legal recognition to an institution is determined purely on the basis of the social 
contributions of that institution.  We must be especially sensitive to the meaning that institutions 
have for individuals in reckoning the extent to which they deserve special status . . . .  For the 
same reasons—because of the significance to intimate selves—friendship relationships deserve 
social recognition and legal protection. 
Schoeman, supra note 33, at 266–67. 
215. Levinson, supra note 29 at 636; cf. Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment 
Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 267 (2006) (“[M]any . . . 
disclosures take place in the course of defined relationships, such as wife/husband, patient/doctor, 
client/attorney, and penitent/priest, where society’s interest in maintaining the full flow of information 
justifies . . . an evidentiary privilege.  We also can identify other relationships that have enough societal 
significance . . . to justify protecting the disclosing party’s interest in the confidentiality of information 
even if society does not recognize that the information should be privileged from disclosure in court 
proceedings.”). 
216. See generally Julie B. Nobel, Note, Ensuring Meaningful Jailhouse Legal Assistance: The Need for a 
Jailhouse Lawyer-Inmate Privilege, 18 CARDOZA L. REV. 1569, 1584–85 (1997) (“Wigmore’s four-part test 
has been criticized for being ambiguous and for failing to explain accurately the reasons for 
communication privileges.  Many writers now recognize that this simple utilitarian test cannot, and 
should not, be the sole means for determining the relationships to which the communication privilege 
should apply.”) (footnote omitted). 
217. In Allred v. State, for example, Alaska Supreme Court Justice Pro Tem. John Dimond 
asserted that the “need for a privilege should not depend upon community approval of the 
relationship” at issue.  Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 428 (Alaska 1976) (Dimond, J., concurring).  
Dimond maintained that it instead is “the purpose of the relationship and its legitimate value to the 
participants which should be weighed against the truth-finding function of the courts.”  Id. at 429 
39
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to professionalism,”218 in that “the only persons, other than one’s spouse, 
with whom it is ‘safe’ to speak about intimate matters, are those with 
professional credentials.”219  Stated more colloquially, “the State . . . has 
declared, through assignment of testimonial privileges, that relationships 
with a legal spouse or certified psychiatrist are ‘more valuable’ than those 
with a . . . compassionate friend.”220 
Levinson is not alone in lamenting this phenomenon.221  Contrasting the 
absence of a friendship privilege with the existence of an accountant-client 
privilege in several states,222 another commentator made the following 
observation: 
 
(emphasis added); see also Molony, supra note 157, at 259–60 (“Courts traditionally have based their 
privilege decisions on the status of the communicators, rather than focusing, as Wigmore did, on the 
type of communication involved and the societal importance of the relationship between the parties.”). 
218. Levinson, supra note 29 at 647; see also Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied 
Waiver and the Evisceration of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 
91 (2008) (“[M]any privileges—including the psychotherapist-patient privilege—came about by 
intensive lobbying efforts by professionals seeking special status for their communications.”). 
219. Levinson, supra note 29 at 647.  Elizabeth G. Thornburg explains:  
Examining privileges as a group, one could easily conclude that the law is not primarily concerned 
with personal values and intimate relationships.  Communications between parents and children, 
brothers and sisters, lovers, and friends are not protected by a testimonial privilege.  Instead, the 
law favors various professionals, . . . and gives privileges to communications with professionals 
much more readily than to communications with intimates . . . .” 
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 
69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 190 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
220. Levinson, supra note 29 at 657. 
221. See, e.g., Marianne E. Scott, Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Preserving and Protecting 
the Fundamental Right to Family Privacy, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 901, 902 (1983) (“Despite the expansion of 
professional testimonial privileges, nonprofessional privileges have not enjoyed a similar growth in 
testimonial privileges.  The only communication privilege that does not involve a professional is the 
privilege protecting marital communications.”).  This phenomenon is occasionally associated with what 
has become known as the “power” theory of testimonial privileges, which holds that “whatever citizens 
or professional organizations command the most power and social prestige are likely to have their 
communications privileged by legislators or the judiciary.”  R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal 
Privileges After Crawford, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 339, 358 n.144 (2006); see also Charles Nesson, Modes of 
Analysis: The Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1494 (1985) 
(“The vast majority of new privileges have been created by statute, a process that certainly requires the 
exercise of political power.”). 
222. The common law did not recognize an accountant-client privilege, and there continues to 
be no such privilege under federal law.  See United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 
1027, 1040 (D. Nev. 2006) (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)).  Nevertheless, 
“to date at least sixteen states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have enacted accountant/client 
privilege statutes.”  In re A Special Investigation No. 202, 452 A.2d 458, 460 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); 
see also Christopher D. Jones, Recent Development, Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court Adopts a 
40
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The unspoken message is that the communications between friends are not 
as important as are those between, for example, an accountant and a client.  
While a free and open exchange of information and opinions between 
accountant and client is apparently vital, a free and open exchange of 
information and opinions between friends apparently is less so.223 
VI.    THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF JAFFEE V. REDMOND 
Nascent as it may be,224 the argument for recognizing a friendship 
privilege was bolstered by the Supreme Court’s recognition of a federal 
common law psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond.225  
Invoking Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,226 the Jaffee Court 
effectively held (and several lower federal courts had previously 
concluded)227 that this privilege satisfies Wigmore’s four-part test for the 
recognition of new testimonial privileges.228 
 
Testimonial Privilege for Psychotherapists and Extends the Privilege to Licensed Social Workers, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 
252, 266 (1997) (asserting “an accountant-client privilege, which is already recognized in several states, 
may . . . eventually be recognized in most or all of the fifty states”).  For a discussion of the prospects 
for a federal version of the accountant-client privilege, see Molony, supra note 157. 
223. Kaufman, supra note 35 at 655. 
224. See generally Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys., 210 F.R.D. 597, 606 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (“[T]here 
must always be . . . that court which takes the first step into an area left to common law 
development . . . .”). 
225. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996). 
226. See id. at 8 (“Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes federal courts to define 
new privileges by interpreting ‘common law principles . . . in the light of reason and experience.’” 
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 501)).  For a brief discussion of the rule’s operation, see supra notes 5853–64 
and accompanying text. 
227. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 1012 
n.13 (D.N.J.) (“Wigmore cites four requirements necessary to establish a privilege, all of which are met 
in the context of the psychotherapist-patient relationship.”), aff’d, 879 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Friedman, 636 F. Supp. 462, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[T]he four conditions advanced by 
Professor Wigmore as necessary to the establishment of a privilege could obtain in a true 
psychotherapist-patient relationship.” (citing In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d Cir. 1983))). 
228. See Jennifer Sawyer Klein, Note, “I’m Your Therapist, You Can Tell Me Anything”: The Supreme 
Court Confirms the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 731 
(1998) (“The psychotherapist patient-privilege, as defined in Jaffee, meets the conditions of the four-
part Wigmore test.  Although the majority did not directly cite to this test in its opinion, much of the 
reasoning seems to derive from the basic principles of the test.”) (footnote omitted); cf. Mary Kearny 
Stroube, Comment, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: Are Some Patients More Privileged Than Others?, 
10 PAC. L.J. 801, 819 (1979) (“These four criteria have been applied to the psychotherapist-patient 
relationship by a number of commentators, all of whom agree that the psychotherapeutic relationship 
. . . meets these standards.”) (footnote omitted). 
41
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Significantly, the Jaffee Court defined this “newly-recognized privilege”229 
broadly enough to encompass an individual’s confidential therapeutic 
communications with a licensed social worker.230  The Court explained this 
aspect of its decision in functional terms: 
The reasons for recognizing a privilege for treatment by psychiatrists and 
psychologists apply with equal force to treatment by a clinical social 
worker . . . .  Today, social workers provide a significant amount of mental 
health treatment.  Their clients often include the poor and those of modest 
means who could not afford the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist, 
but whose counseling sessions serve the same public goals.231 
The significance of the Jaffee Court’s reasoning for the recognition of a 
friendship privilege stems from the therapeutic role friendship often plays 
in people’s lives.232  Justice Antonin Scalia referred to this role in a 
 
229. See United States v. Hardy, 640 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79 (D. Me. 2009) (characterizing the Jaffee 
privilege); see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting the Court was 
“creating a privilege that [was] new, vast, and ill-defined”).  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Jaffee there actually was a “split in the circuits over recognition of a psychotherapist/client privilege.”  
United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998).  However, “[e]ven those circuits that did 
recognize a psychotherapist-privilege prior to Jaffee limited its application to psychiatrists and 
psychologists.”  Merrily S. Archer, Recent Development, All Aboard the Bandwagon!: The Uncertain Scope 
of the Federal Psychotherapist-Client Privilege in the Aftermath of Jaffee v. Redmond, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 355, 372 n.84 (1997) (citing cases). 
230. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. at 15 (showing the origins of the social worker-client 
privilege in relation to a psychotherapist-patient privilege).  Like the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
from which it is derived, In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 
at 1001, the social worker-client privilege “was unknown at common law.”  People v. Bass, 
529 N.Y.S.2d 961, 962 (Sup. Ct. 1988). 
231. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S at 15–16 (footnote and citations omitted).  For a prior 
academic discussion of this aspect of Jaffee, see Melanie Stephens Stone, Case Note, Jaffee v. Redmond: 
The Supreme Court Adopts a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and Extends the Scope to Encompass Licensed 
Social Workers, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1283 (1997). 
232. See Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299, 302 (Mass. 2008) (describing two friends 
who “confided in each other as they weathered turmoil in their personal lives”); People v. Fentress, 
425 N.Y.S.2d 485, 492 (Dutchess Cty. Ct. 1980) (describing an individual who “was in effect called 
upon to serve as psychologist, therapist, counselor, and friend”); see also Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Simon, 507 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Pa. 1986) (observing that there are many different ways to manage the 
“pressures [that] come to bear on us during our daily lives,” including “individual psychotherapy, group 
therapy, and reliance upon family and friends”); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and 
Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 731 (2016) (referring to a possible “functional equivalence 
between psychotherapists’ advice, on the one hand, and the advice of friends and family members, on 
the other”).  For a scholarly discussion of one variation of the therapeutic role of friends, see Sherwin 
Davidson & Ted Packard, The Therapeutic Value of Friendship Between Women, 5 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN 
Q., 495(1981). 
42
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dissenting opinion in which he asserted that in order to fulfill its purpose,233 
the privilege the Jaffee Court was recognizing would need to encompass 
confidential therapeutic communications with an even broader class of 
“psychotherapists”234 than the majority identified.235  With characteristic 
rhetorical flourish,236 Justice Scalia observed: 
When is it, one must wonder, that the psychotherapist came to play such an 
indispensable role in the maintenance of the citizenry’s mental health?  For 
most of history, men and women have worked out their difficulties by talking 
to, inter alios, parents, siblings, best friends, and bartenders—none of whom was 
awarded a privilege against testifying in court.237 
Justice Scalia’s reasoning has since been invoked in support of  
the emerging parent-child privilege,238 which—contrary to his  
 
233. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. at 18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has discussed at 
some length the benefit that will be purchased by creation of the evidentiary privilege in this case: the 
encouragement of psychoanalytic counseling.”). 
234. See generally Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 97 (D.N.J. 1989) (“Psychotherapist is a broad, 
imprecise term that can encompass psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, clergy and others.”). 
235. See United States v. Robinson, 5 F. Supp. 3d 933, 939 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“Justice Scalia 
would have the privilege be ‘categorical enough to achieve its announced policy objective.’” (quoting 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting))); Stern, supra note 119, at 632 (“Justice Scalia 
. . . highlighted the irony of failing to protect the relationships that traditionally benefit from open 
communication.”); cf. Christopher B. Mueller, The Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee: Trust 
and Other Values in a Therapeutic Age, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 945, 955 (1998) (“the privilege approved in Jaffee 
is arguably flawed because it is too narrow”). 
236. See Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia’s Sermonette, 72 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 863, 863 (1997) (“Justice Antonin Scalia’s flamboyant judicial rhetoric and colorful writing style 
more than occasionally make headlines.  Seemingly alone among the justices, Scalia is the master of the 
eminently quotable turn-of-phrase, the arresting quip, the provocatively expressed legal argument.”). 
237. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also RICHARD RESTAK, THE 
NEW BRAIN: HOW THE MODERN AGE IS REWIRING YOUR MIND 121 (2003) (“For centuries the 
principle treatment for depression was talking to friends. . . .  Later, thanks to Sigmund Freud and 
others, the treatment of depression came within the province of psychiatrists who formalized ‘talk’ 
treatment into various kinds of psychotherapy.”). 
238. See, e.g., Hillary B. Farber, Do You Swear to Tell the Truth, The Whole Truth, and Nothing But the 
Truth Against Your Child, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551, 571–72 (2010) (“In Jaffee, Justice Antonin Scalia 
asked an empirical question . . . concerning the benefits of seeking advice from one’s mother . . . .  
Justice Scalia’s remark underscores the necessity of parent-child communication, particularly as it 
applies to minors.” (discussing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting))); cf. Maureen 
P. O’Sullivan, An Examination of the State and Federal Courts’ Treatment of the Parent-Child Privilege, 39 CATH. 
LAW. 201, 221 (1999) (“Since Jaffee, it appears that federal courts are not as adamant as they once were 
against recognizing the parent-child privilege.”); Catherine J. Ross, Implementing Constitutional Rights for 
Juveniles: The Parent-Child Privilege in Context, 14 STAN. L. POL’Y REV. 85, 90 (2003) (“Support for 
development of a parent-child privilege is found in the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Jaffee v. 
43
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intimation239—already exists in some jurisdictions precisely in order “to 
permit and encourage children to confide in their parents and seek their 
advice in times of trouble.”240  Recognition of this privilege also reflects the 
fact that “the poor and those of modest means”241 will often turn to their 
parents (and occasionally their children)242 rather than to paid professionals 
for therapeutic guidance.243  There is no principled reason for the law of 
testimonial privilege to discourage this choice.244  Indeed, it is both illogical 
and inequitable to require individuals to “seek a professional 
psychotherapist’s assistance, rather than parental assistance, in order for 
[their] communications to remain privileged.”245 
 
Redmond.”).  For a discussion of Jaffee’s potential impact on the parent-child privilege, see Ricafort, supra 
note 15. 
239. See Carolyn Peddy Courville, Comment, Rationales for the Confidentiality of Psychotherapist-
Patient Communications: Testimonial Privilege and the Constitution, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 187, 217 (1998) 
(“[C]ontrary to Justice Scalia’s sarcastic comment, a parent-child privilege has been recognized by more 
than one court and several legislatures.”) (footnote omitted). 
240. State v. Stevens, 580 N.W.2d 75, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (interpreting MINN. STAT. 
§ 595.02, subd. 1(j)); see also Cabello v. Mississippi, 471 So. 2d 332, 340 (Miss. 1985) (noting that the 
parent-child privilege is “directed to the confidences a son or daughter might reveal to a parent in 
expectation of guidance through counseling or moral support”); Franklin, supra note 67, at 174 
(asserting that “the primary purpose of the parent-child privilege is to encourage children to confide in 
their parents”). 
241. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 16 (1996). 
242. See generally Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (Mass. 1983) (“[A] 
parent does not need the advice of a minor child in the same sense that a child may need the advice of 
a parent . . . .”); North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Stucky, 338 P.3d 56, 65 (Mont. 2014) (noting “an adult child’s 
reliance on a parent for guidance and support is likely different from the parent’s reliance on a child”); 
Covey, supra note 37, at 904 (“[C]hildren go to their parents seeking advice and guidance more often 
than parents go to their children.”). 
243. See Perry, supra note 38, at 107 (“When a child is faced with a problem, the child (whether 
an adult or a minor) instinctively turns to his or her parents for guidance and advice.  Indeed, it seems 
likely that adult children rely on their parents before resorting to paying a professional for assistance.”); 
cf. Stern, supra note 119, at 623–24 (“For parents and children who . . . cannot afford a 
psychotherapist . . . the family provides one of the only available zones of safety for them to voice 
concerns before they grow beyond their control.”). 
244. See Perry, supra note 38, at 107 (“[L]ogic suggests the communications between parent and 
child should be protected perhaps even before professional disclosures.”). 
245. Yolanda L. Ayala & Thomas C. Martyn, Note, To Tell or Not to Tell? An Analysis of Testimonial 
Privileges: The Parent-Child and Reporter’s Privileges, 9 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 163, 179 (1993); see 
also Ann M. Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications: An Examination and a Proposal, 
16 FAM. L.Q. 1, 13 (1982) (“It is anomalous that the child’s relationship with his natural ally and 
traditional source of guidance and protection has not been accorded the same protection from 
compelled disclosure as has the professional relationship.”). 
44
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However, as Justice Scalia seemed to recognize,246 many troubled 
individuals may be at least as likely to seek therapeutic guidance from their 
friends as from their parents,247 and some people may rely exclusively on 
their friends for advice and support in times of trouble.248  Indeed, while 
some scholars have questioned the therapeutic value of friendship,249 
others insist that therapeutic communications will: 
play a larger and larger role in friendship in our own day—a day that has 
seen . . . the triumph of the therapeutic, in which a friend, as like as not several 
friends, serve one another as surrogate psychotherapists, to whom to recount 
disappointments, secrets, troubles little and large, so that the word “intimacy,” 
so long associated with friendship, has also become nearly synonymous with 
“confessional.”250 
 
246. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (highlighting the recognition 
of troubled individuals seeking advice); see also RICHARD RESTAK, THE NEW BRAIN: HOW THE 
MODERN AGE IS REWIRING YOUR MIND 121 (2003) (reviewing the support of Justice Scalia to 
troubled individuals). 
247. See People v. Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (“[An] adult . . . is more likely 
to seek advice and guidance from persons other than their parents.  These people may be . . . close 
friends . . . .”); Eisel v. Bd. of Educ., 597 A.2d 447, 453 (Md. 1990) (“An adolescent who is thinking of 
suicide is more likely to share these feelings with a friend than with a . . . parent . . . .” (quoting Monthly 
Memo, MARYLAND OFFICE FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Apr., 1986, at 3 Memorandum from the 
Maryland Office for Children and Youth, at 3 (Apr. 1986))); State v. Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297, 1301–02 
(Wash. 1988) (observing that “children often seem more reluctant to discuss private matters with their 
parents than with . . . friends, especially when those matters concern misdeeds of the child”). 
248. See Feinberg, supra note 148, at 659 (“Many people rely exclusively upon friends for 
assistance in times of serious emotional distress.”); cf. Davidson & Packard, supra note 232, at 496 (“A 
friend is frequently the person to whom individuals first turn for help with problems.”) (citations 
omitted). 
249.  
If the problems facing mental health patients could be discussed with their friends or mothers, 
they no doubt would be.  It is precisely because some problems are so personal and potentially 
embarrassing that people seek out unknown and unrelated therapists with whom to discuss the 
problems.  It seems very unlikely that one would discuss sexual dysfunction, childhood abuse, or 
intimate marital problems with friends, and it seems even less likely one would discuss such things 
with one’s mother. 
Courville, supra note 239, at 217. 
250. JOSEPH EPSTEIN, FRIENDSHIP: AN EXPOSÉ 61 (2006); cf. Sioux Assocs., Inc. v. Iowa 
Liquor Control Comm’n, 132 N.W.2d 421, 426 (Iowa 1965) (noting that the term “confidant” is a 
synonym for the word “friend”); see generally Davidson & Packard, supra note 232, at 496 (suggesting 
that “friendship has therapeutic value and can serve as a substitute for therapy”). 
45
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This would seem to make friendship—like the parent-child 
relationship251—a logical candidate for the protection of a testimonial 
privilege.252  Discussing the implications of Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Jaffee,253 one prominent scholar in the interdisciplinary field of law and 
psychotherapy,254 Professor Daniel Shuman,255 posed the following 
rhetorical questions: “Why should we regard governmental intrusion on 
parent-child relationships . . . as any less pernicious than intrusion on 
psychotherapist-patient relationships?  What of governmental intrusion on 
confidential communications between siblings or close friends?”256 
Professor Shuman’s inquiry is apt.257  It is not at all clear why the law 
should operate to discourage emotionally troubled individuals (or anyone 
 
251. See Watts, supra note, 199 at 609 (“Its similarities to the psychotherapist-patient relationship 
. . . make the parent-child relationship a perfect candidate for a privilege.”); cf. Belmer v. Virginia, 
553 S.E.2d 123, 131 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (Elder, J., dissenting) (“Numerous . . . legal principles 
acknowledge the importance of the role of a parent as a confidante and counselor to his minor child.”). 
252. See People v. Wood, 505 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (“Privileges are intended 
to encourage society’s interest in open discussion between persons in need and those from whom they 
seek help.”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 523 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. 1994); Gelzinis, supra note 31, 
at 548 (“While the law does much for family members, extending certain legal measures to include 
friends would be a realistic acknowledgment that in times of difficulty, we often depend on the selfless 
acts of friends as well as family.”). 
253. See Daniel W. Shuman, Legal Boundaries on Conceptions of Privacy: Seeking Therapeutic Accord, in 
CONFIDENTIALITY: ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CLINICAL DILEMMAS 266, 274 (Charles Levin et 
al. eds. 2003) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 22 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
254. See generally Louis Everstine, Law and Psychotherapy: The State of the Relationship, in 
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE LAW 3, 23 (Louis Everstine & Diana Sullivan Everstine eds. 1986) (“In 
spite of the many differences of interpretation and emphasis and profound variance in values and goals, 
law and psychotherapy remain purposefully intertwined.  The importance of one discipline to the other 
will reaffirm itself as their relationship improves with understanding.”). 
255. Professor Shuman has been described as a “well-respected scholar in the area of law and 
psychiatry.”  John B. Attanasio, In Memoriam: Professor Daniel W. Shuman, 64 SMU L. REV. 1189, 1189 
(2011); see also Liza H. Gold & Robert I. Simon, Daniel W. Shuman: A Gift for Collaboration, 64 SMU L. 
REV. 1197, 1199 (2011) (describing Professor Shuman as “one of the preeminent scholars in the field 
of mental health and the law”). 
256. Shuman, supra note 253, at 274; cf. Fischel, supra note 161, at 3 (“[W]hy should 
communications with attorneys be ‘encouraged’ more than communications with close friends . . . or 
relatives?  I suspect that outside the legal profession, many believe these other communications need 
to be encouraged more than interactions with lawyers.”). 
257. See Scott, supra note 221, at 920 (“An anomaly . . . exists in the current law on testimonial 
privileges.  It is difficult to rationalize why a professional relationship . . . that may last only one hour 
is afforded more legal protection than the vital parent-child relationship that endures for the lifetime 
of both parties.”); cf. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 
979 (Del. Ch. 2003) (observing that some personal friendships “may border on or even exceed familial 
loyalty and closeness”), aff’d, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).  See generally Levinson, supra note 29, at 647 
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else)258 from confiding in their friends,259 as the present scheme of 
testimonial privileges so clearly does.260  There is, in particular, little 
principled reason for the courts to recognize a parent-child privilege without 
also recognizing a comparable friendship privilege.261  As one commentator 
observed: “[M]any individuals may share their closest, most confidential 
communications with someone other than a spouse, child, or parent.  In 
such cases, it may indeed seem unfair to protect communications between 
a child and parent who may or may not be close, but not between lifelong 
friends.”262 
 
(lamenting the fact that “the present scheme of privileges actually denigrates the general importance of 
private intimate relationships”). 
258. Among other things, the absence of a friendship privilege may discourage the types of 
conversations in which people could “warn a close friend . . . of the folly of being involved in criminal 
activity . . . in an effort to cause him to mend his ways.”  In re Anonymous, 5 Pa. D. & C.4th 44, 56 
(Pa. Disciplinary Bd. 1988).  Tellingly, a similar consideration underlies the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege: 
[C]ommunications regarding intentions or desires to commit future crime are at the very heart of 
why a patient may seek psycho-therapeutic care.  A patient may reveal these dangerous, criminal 
impulses to the therapist for the very purpose of overcoming and not acting on them. 
Whether or not the patient is truly seeking help to overcome these impulses . . ., revealing 
them to the therapist creates an opportunity for intervention that is critical to the 
psychotherapist’s professional purpose. 
George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Tarasoff Duty 
and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV. 33, 61–62 (1999). 
259. See State v. Albo, 584 P.2d 906, 911 (Utah 1978) (Maughan, J., dissenting) (asserting that 
“one should . . . be able to have some control over . . . the persons one chooses to confide in”); Covey, 
supra note 37, at 897 (asserting that “[i]ntimacy and privacy in personal relationships must be left to the 
judgment of each individual”). 
260. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 645 (“A person may have a privileged relationship with his 
psychiatrist, but not with his psychologically astute close friend or colleague.”); Mueller, supra note 235, 
at 955 (“There is no general right to block inquiry into confidential communications with . . . friends, 
where surely all of us seek and obtain help and support in adjusting to the world and working through 
the problems of living.”); Garber, supra note 30, at 926 (“The [psychotherapist] privilege requires the 
therapist to be a licensed mental health professional, therefore confidential communications made to 
friends . . . in an effort to gain support or help are not privileged.”). 
261. See People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Ill. 1983) (“Were we to recognize . . . a 
[parent-child] privilege under our judicial authority, it would be impossible to contain it logically from 
spreading . . . to close friends.”); see also Covey, supra note 37, at 894 (“[O]nce a parent-child privilege 
is recognized, litigants will clamor for privileges covering other close relationships, such as between 
best friends or relatives, based on the same social policy grounds as those underlying the parent-child 
privilege.”). 
262. Covey, supra note 37, at 894; see also Levinson, supra note 29, at 651 (“One may, to be sure, 
be particularly bothered by the possibility of a child or parent called upon to testify against one another, 
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VII.    THE DEFINITIONAL IMPEDIMENT TO THE RECOGNITION 
OF A FRIENDSHIP PRIVILEGE 
A. The Nature of the Problem 
Despite his enthusiasm for a friendship privilege,263 Professor Levinson 
acknowledged the existence of a fundamental problem in identifying those 
who would be protected by the privilege.264  Professor Schoeman also 
viewed this definitional challenge as an impediment to the privilege’s 
recognition: 
[W]hile it is in general clear who is married to whom and what rights and 
responsibilities are present in the case of persons married to one another, it is 
not clear what the friendship relationship involves, in part because there are 
many levels of friendship; nor is it clear who is friend to whom and at what 
level; nor, finally, is it clear what the range of rights and responsibilities are in 
the case of friendships.265 
One potential solution to this problem would be for state  
legislatures (or perhaps Congress)266 to create a friendship  
 
but one then has to ask why the same sorts of concerns do not arise when best friends . . . are asked 
to testify in similar situations.”). 
263. Levinson is generally deemed to have argued “on behalf of a testimonial privilege for 
friends.”  Parent-Child Loyalty, supra note 26, at 925 n.80 (discussing Levinson, supra note 29).  However, 
his position is somewhat more nuanced than this characterization suggests.  Although he asserted that 
“a genuine commitment to the values of friendship and private life will require significant changes in 
the way we defend and explain, or explain and reject, the traditional testimonial privileges,” he also 
noted that any “rejection of the status quo” could take the form of “either expansion or limitation of the 
existing privileges[.]”  Levinson, supra note 29, at 643–44 (emphasis added). 
264. See Parent-Child Loyalty, supra note 26, at 925 n.80 (“A testimonial privilege for friends 
would present the problem, clearly recognized by Levinson, of how to determine which of a person’s 
‘friends’ would be excused from testifying.”). 
265. Schoeman, supra note 33, at 266; see also Brown v. Comcast Corp., No. ED CV 16-00264-
AB (SPx), 2016 WL 9109112, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (“To begin to define what could be 
considered a friendship relationship creates endless concerns.  Unlike a marital or parent-child 
relationship, a friendship relationship has no accepted biological or legal inception.”); Marshall v. Local 
Union 20, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. C 78-407, 1979 WL 1864, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 1979) 
(“[H]ow is it to be determined what constitutes a friend?  Does the term require a strictly personal 
relationship, or does it extend to mutual friends?  Or friends of friends?”), aff’d, 611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 
1979). 
266. Although Congress has the authority to create and define the scope of a privilege by statute, 
it “has preferred to leave to the courts questions of which privileges to recognize and when to apply 
them.”  In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Marshall v. Anderson, 459 So. 
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privilege,267 and, as part of the legislative process,268 identify those 
individuals who would be entitled to claim the protection of the privilege.269  
However, Levinson himself did not favor this approach,270 and it is by no 
means clear that legislatures could establish a satisfactory definition of the 
term “friend.”271  Because the word traditionally encompasses individuals 
in a broad range of relationships,272 not all of whom would have an equal 
claim to the benefits of a testimonial privilege,273 it may be preferable to 
 
2d 384, 386 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (“[V]irtually the entire federal law of privilege is based upon 
the common law rather than either rule or statute.”). 
267. See Hartsock v. Goodyear Dunlap Tires N. Am. Ltd., 813 S.E.2d 696, 699 (S.C. 2018) (“‘[A] 
privilege may be created by statute’ as deemed appropriate by Congress or a state legislature.” (quoting 
Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 (1982))); cf. Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 
1203, 1205–06 (Mass. 1983) (“In recent years . . . courts have tended to leave the creation of evidentiary 
privileges to legislative determination.”). 
268. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Schneider, 130 P.3d 991, 995 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (“[I]n 
promulgating its evidentiary rules, the [Arizona] supreme court deferred to any legislative definition of 
‘privilege.’” (construing ARIZ. R. EVID. 501)); see also Covey, supra note 37, at 899 (“Legislation has an 
advantage over judicial recognition of privileges in that a statute is easier to administer, and relieves the 
courts of having to make difficult case-by-case evaluations of whether a common law privilege should 
apply.”). 
269. See Gelzinis, supra note 31, at 527–28 (“Legislators may be able to develop a general 
definition, and Florida and New York have crafted broad legal definitions of a friend for the purpose 
of making healthcare proxy decisions.” (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101 (West 2010) and N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 2961 (McKinney 2007))). 
270. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 654 (“[T]he State should define as minimally as possible, if 
at all, those who are entitled to play a role as over confidantes.”); cf. Michael L. Closen & Joan E. 
Maloney, The Health Care Surrogate Act in Illinois: Another Rejection of Domestic Partners’ Rights, 19 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 479, 496 (1995) (“Is not close friendship in the eyes of the beholder?  Indeed, is it not the case that 
many people tend to regard themselves as closer to certain other people than the other people would 
agree?”). 
271. See Closen & Maloney, supra note 270, at 495 (discussing a statute that “purports to do the 
impossible, to define a close friend”); Covey, supra note 37, at 898 (“Statutes can and do specify when 
a parent-child relationship exists and when it is terminated.  Specifications of this sort would be difficult 
if not impossible to formulate for nonfamilial friendships.”). 
272. See Phillips v. State, 271 P.3d 457, 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012) (“There are many levels or 
degrees of friendship in our society.”); People v. Forbes, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836, 840 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(“[T]he word ‘friend’ has numerous meanings”); People v. Thompson, 252 Cal. Rptr. 698, 700 (Ct. 
App. 1988) (“‘Friends’ is a common term with a variety of connotations.”); Carr v. United States, 
531 A.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. 1987) (noting that the term “‘friend’ can have a wide range of meanings”). 
273. See Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 271 So. 3d 889, 894 
(Fla. 2018) (“‘[F]riendship’ in the traditional sense of the word does not necessarily signify a close 
relationship.  It is commonly understood that friendship exists on a broad spectrum: some friendships 
are close and others are not.” (citation omitted)); State v. Hattaway, 156 So. 159, 160 (La. 1934) (“Some 
friendships are purely casual; others are close, intimate, and of long standing.”); United States Tr. Co. 
v. Montclair Tr. Co., 33 A.2d 901, 904 (N.J. Ch. 1943) (“The word ‘friends’ has no precise meaning.  It 
is commonly used to describe undefinable relations which vary in degree from the greatest intimacy to 
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leave the courts with “a measure of flexibility in determining whether, in all 
the circumstances involved, certain communications should be 
protected.”274  As one court observed: 
Just as the recognition of privileges must be undertaken on a case-by-case 
basis, so too must the scope of the privilege be considered.  This is necessarily 
so because the appropriate scope of a privilege, like the propriety of the 
privilege itself, is determined by balancing the interests protected by shielding 
the evidence sought with those advanced by disclosure.275 
However, leaving the resolution of the definitional problem to a judicial 
determination on a case-by-case basis may be equally unsatisfactory,276 as 
courts may be no more successful than legislatures in defining the term 
“friend” or “friendship.”277  As one court observed nearly a century ago: 
The word ‘friends’ . . . has no accepted statutory or other controlling 
limitations, and in fact has no precise sense at all.  Friendship is a word of 
broad and varied application.  It is commonly used to describe the undefinable 
relationships which exist not only between those connected by ties of kinship 
 
an acquaintance more or less casual.” (citation omitted)); Int’l Bank of Commerce v. Int’l Energy Dev. 
Corp., 981 S.W.2d 38, 45 (Tex. App. 1998) (“The term ‘friend’ is used loosely in the English language 
and can refer to a person one knows well or one who is more correctly termed an acquaintance.  An 
acquaintanceship springs from occasional interaction so that one knows a person but is not especially 
familiar with him or her.” (citations omitted)). 
274. Comm. on Fed. Courts, Revisiting the Codification of Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
THE RECORD, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 148, 153; cf. In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., 
400 F. Supp. 2d 386, 389–90 (D. Mass. 2005) (observing that “courts have the power to be flexible and 
adaptive with regard to the law of privilege”).  See generally Krattenmaker, supra note 128, at 657 (“[I]t is 
not necessary, in order that a testimonial privilege substantially further enjoyment of the right of 
privacy, that it be carefully defined at the time the communication occurred.”). 
275. In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 639–40 (6th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted); see also Wachtel v. 
Health Net, Inc., 482 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Rule 501 requires the federal courts, in determining 
the nature and scope of an evidentiary privilege, to engage in the sort of case-by-case analysis that is 
central to common-law adjudication.”). 
276. See Covey, supra note 37, at 898 n.164 (“Determinations of the closeness of friendships on 
a case-by-case basis would consume too much time and would require guesswork.”); cf. Gelzinis, supra 
note 31, at 528 (“Although every person feels they could say with precision who their closest friends 
are, the vague standards and individual preferences by which we all make these judgments present a 
significant challenge for any public-policy maker.”). 
277. See Hogan v. Henderson, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190 (D. Ariz. 2000) (“Friendship 
relationships are truly a mystifying phenomenon for one knows not why any particular pair connects 
or rubs each other the wrong way.”), aff’d, 15 F. App’x 458 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Thompson, 252 Cal. 
Rptr. at 701 (“[A] judge or jury might have differing views concerning the intensity of the relationship 
involved in a friendship”). 
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or marriage, but as well between strangers in blood, and which vary in degree 
from the greatest intimacy to an acquaintance more or less casual.278 
B. Some Suggested Solutions to the Problem 
Some commentators have suggested less conventional solutions to the 
definitional problem underlying the recognition of a friendship privilege.279   
These include Professor David Chambers’ suggestion that individuals be 
permitted “to register their friendships formally with a government 
office.”280  Under Chambers’ proposal, individuals could “fill in a form, get 
it notarized or witnessed,”281 and then “come to a government office and 
register as ‘designated friends.’”282  Those who availed themselves of this 
opportunity would be “entitled to the same testimonial privileges as spouses 
in civil and criminal cases if they enter[ed] the designated friend relationship 
at least two years prior to the event giving rise to the case.”283 
 
278. Clark v. Campbell, 133 A. 166, 170 (N.H. 1926) (emphasis added); see also Roy Ryden 
Anderson, The Wolf at the Campfire: Understanding Confidential Relationships, 53 SMU L. REV. 315, 344 
(2000) (“The term ‘friend’ describes someone with whom one shares a relationship that may vary from 
something slightly more than bare acquaintance to one in which the parties . . . share an abiding trust 
and confidence.”).  One commentator described the problem in the following terms: 
[W]ithout institutional form, without a clearly defined set of norms for behavior or an agreed-
upon set of reciprocal rights and obligations, without even a language that makes distinctions 
between the different kinds of relationships to which we apply the word, there can be no widely 
shared agreement about what is a friend. 
RUBIN, supra note 120, at 8. 
279. See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell – And Other 
Combinations, 103 CAL. L. REV. 919, 934–35 (2015) (noting that where “a friend [is] holding another 
friend’s confidence . . . more than one person’s interests are implicated,” and the law might require that 
the confidence be maintained “until all those with access to the information consent to . . . disclosure”).  
See generally Abrams, supra note 22, at 1127 (“[T]here are . . . different approaches to the idea of 
friendship.”). 
280. Gelzinis, supra note 31, at 528–29 (discussing David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and 
for Lovers of All Sorts, A Status Other Than Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1353 (2001)). 
281. Chambers, supra note 280, at 1359.  One court explained that “the purpose behind 
notarization is twofold: to verify the identity of the person signing the document and to ensure that 
person understands that he subjects himself to penalties of perjury in the statement.”  People v. Allen, 
32 N.E.3d 615, 626 (Ill. 2015). 
282. Chambers, supra note 280, at 1353.  For an extended discussion of how such a friendship 
registry might operate, see Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573 (2013).  Professor 
Aloni argued that “one act of registration” might avoid “the hassle of providing documentation and 
other proof of the relationship to employers, judges, and administrators.”  Id. at 604–05. 
283. Chambers, supra note 280, at 1353.  Professor Chambers’ proposed delay in the attachment 
of the privilege would distinguish it from the marital communications privilege it purportedly would 
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Professor Schoeman proposed a similar system whereby persons who 
wished to claim the benefit of a friendship privilege could execute notarized 
documents reflecting that intent.284  Schoeman argued that after a 
significant period of time—he suggested six months—the parties should be 
required to reaffirm their relationship,285 once again before a notary.286  
From this point forward, confidential communications between these 
formally designated friends would be privileged “on a renewable yearly 
basis.”287 
Both Chambers’ and Schoeman’s proposals seem impractical,288 in part 
because most people are never seriously at risk of being compelled to testify 
against a friend (or having a friend testify against them),289 and thus may 
not perceive the need for the protection of a testimonial privilege until they 
(or a friend) are actually required to testify.290  Even more fundamentally, 
few people are likely to have the type of relationship with a friend that would 
 
mirror.  See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic Partnership and ERISA Preemption, 76 TUL. L. REV. 373, 386–
87 (2001) (“[M]arried couples . . . need not wait a year after the solemnization of their marriage to 
obtain the privileges conferred by marital status; the privileges begin immediately.”). 
284. See Schoeman, supra note 33, at 268 (proposing notarized documents for friendship 
privilege). 
285. This requirement presumably reflects Schoeman’s recognition that “most of us in fact 
change our closest friendships over time.”  Levinson, supra note 29, at 656 n.69.  See, e.g., State v. 
Richardson, 395 S.E.2d 143, 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (describing a relationship that “deteriorated 
from one of friendship and confidence sharing to one of animosity”); see also Rosenbury, supra note 151, 
at 203–04 (observing “individual friendships can be fluid and shifting”). 
286. See Schoeman, supra note 33, at 268 (highlighting how a relationship with a friend can be 
reaffirmed). 
287. Schoeman, supra note 33, at 268.  In a brief article that has received relatively little 
subsequent attention, Judge Edwin Ludwig advocated for the recognition of “friendage” agreements 
that would “resemble business partnership agreements” and be valid for a “term of years, with renewal 
options.”  Judge Edmund V. Ludwig, Friendage, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 149, 158, 162 (1997). 
288. See Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasion of Privacy, 
43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 24–25, 25 n.110 (1995) (asserting “a formal agreement of confidentiality” between 
friends would be “eminently impractical” because “[i]t is hard to conceive of friends writing up a 
contract before they talk”).  See generally Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649 
(2010) (examining the relationship between contract law and friendship).  
289. See generally Thomas E. Baker, The Eleventh Circuit’s First Decade Contribution to the Law of the 
Nation, 1981–1991, 19 NOVA L. REV. 323, 331 (1994) (stating “the average person likely will only see 
the inside of a courtroom . . . when called to jury duty”). 
290. See State v. Gutierrez, No. S-1-SC-36394, slip op. at 17 (N.M. Aug. 30, 2019) (asserting 
“most people seldom appear in court and do not tailor their conversations around what may or may 
not be privileged”); cf. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF 
RELATIONSHIPS 82 (1993) (“That friends must testify against each other may come as a surprise.”). 
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entail registering it with the government291 or formally documenting its 
confidential nature in some other manner.292 
Alluding to the inherent informality of the relationship,293 noted social 
scientist Lillian Rubin observed that “no clear lines mark the beginnings of 
a friendship; often none mark the ending either.”294  Friendship instead “is 
a non-event—a relationship that just becomes, that grows, develops, waxes, 
wanes and, too often perhaps, ends, all without ceremony or ritual to give 
evidence of its existence.”295  Indeed, some scholars deem this informality 
to be the very hallmark of true friendship.296  As one of those scholars 
explained: 
Keeping trusted information private is customarily a moral and casual, not a 
contractual, commitment.  Friends do not habitually enter into legally 
enforceable contracts for privacy.  Whereas asking for confidentiality with 
verbal and nonverbal cues is a socially accepted convention, requesting that a 
friend sign (or click) a document ensuring the privacy of communications 
 
291. See Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein, P.A. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 271 So. 3d 889, 
898 (Fla. 2018) (“[P]eople traditionally ‘communicate’ the existence of their friendships by choosing to 
spend time with their friends in public, introducing their friends to others, or interacting with them in 
other ways that have a public dimension.”). 
292. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL 
L. REV. 261, 280 (1998) (“A person intending to tell her friend that she has tested positive for the HIV 
virus . . . is unlikely to bargain for a return promise not to disclose the information.  Parties in such 
intimate relations . . . typically do not make contractual bargains.”); see also Dolinko, supra note 177, 
at 1114 (observing “people do not typically obtain explicit promises of confidentiality before conveying 
information to others”). 
293. See United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991) (contrasting “informal 
relationships based on kinship and friendship” with “formal relationships created by contract and 
rule”); RUBIN, supra note 120, at 4 (“There are no social rituals, no public ceremonies to honor or 
celebrate friendships of any kind, from the closest to the most distant—not even a linguistic form that 
distinguishes the formal, impersonal relationship from the informal and personal one.”). 
294. RUBIN, supra note 120, at 4; see also Leib, supra note 288, at 696 (observing “friendship tends 
to be fluid” and “does not rely on formalities for entry or exit”); Agee, supra note 106, at 373 
(“Friendship is freely, and often casually, entered into and exited from with no formal contracts or 
explicit boundaries.”). 
295. RUBIN, supra note 120, at 5; see also Kerr, supra note 40, at 4 (“[F]riendship . . . is organic, 
or occurs over time”). 
296. See, e.g., Dane, supra note 149, at 1182 (“Close friendship . . . is accorded a distinct and 
honored place in our culture precisely because of its lack, on the whole, of legal form.”); see also 
Rosenbury, supra note 151, at 206 (asserting friendship “thrives on lack of state recognition”). 
53
Moberly: Exploring the Merits of a Friendship Privilege
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020
  
962 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:909 
made within the relationship can signal distrust and be noxious to the 
friendship.297 
Tellingly, Schoeman himself described his proposal for the licensing of 
friendships as “a potentially dangerous role for the state to engage in and a 
disastrous omen for the future of friendship.”298  Chambers, in turn, 
speculated that “almost no one” would register their friendships with the 
state under his proposal because those eligible to do so might “never hear 
about the opportunity or, if they did hear about it, would conclude that the 
benefits are too few or too remote to be worth the effort.”299  If this is 
indeed the case,300 Chambers’ and Schoeman’s proposed requirement that 
the parties’ friendship be documented significantly in advance of their 
assertion of the privilege (two years in Chambers’ case,301 and at least six 
months under Schoeman’s proposal)302 would seem to render the 
protection afforded by their proposals illusory.303 
 
297. Patricia Sánchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online Interpersonal Privacy, 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 705 (2010) (footnote omitted); cf. Leib, supra note 288, at 679 
(“Although agreements and understandings between parties to . . . friendships are not at all rare, the 
parties frequently wish to avoid formalities.  It is not in the spirit of the relationship to get too formal, 
and the very request for a formality from one of the parties signals to the other that perhaps the 
relationship is taking on a rather different character.”). 
298. Schoeman, supra note 33, at 268.  Professor Richard Stith also argued forcefully against the 
creation of a “State Friendship Registry,” posing a series of rhetorical questions to illustrate his 
concerns: 
Consider, if you will, not only economic costs, but also the quality of civil society.  . . . Even if the 
government used mainly positive incentives . . . to support its scheme, would there not be too 
great an intrusion into private life?  Would we not have lost too much freedom and flexibility in 
our personal relationships?  Would we not have created an excessive bureaucracy? 
Richard Stith, Keep Friendship Unregulated, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 263, 271 (2004). 
299. Chambers, supra note 280, at 1357; cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevetz, A Social Networks Theory of 
Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 925 (2005) (“In the vast majority of . . . situations, the law does not 
matter much to people who disclose private information about themselves.  When we disclose sensitive 
information to friends, the law generally has little effect on our expectations that these friends will keep 
the information secret.”). 
300. See Kaufman, supra note 35, at 658–59 (“It is conceivable that the law neglects friendship 
because that relationship is so natural or fundamental to Americans that it need not be regulated.”); 
Leib, supra note 288, at 717 (“The effort to protect friendships (mostly by punishing bad and false 
friends) would have the perverse effect of discouraging them.”). 
301. See supra notes 280–83 and accompanying text. 
302. See supra notes 284–87 and accompanying text. 
303. There is, of course, also the impracticability of expecting people to formalize their 
relationships with all of the various friends with whom they ultimately might need or want to have a 
privileged relationship.  See Rosenbury, supra note 151, at 203 (observing “[m]any types of friendships 
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C. Professor Levinson’s Ticket Proposal 
Professor Levinson proposed an alternative solution to the definitional 
problem whereby the state would issue everyone a limited number of 
“privilege tickets”304 that “could be distributed to those with whom a 
person wished to assure a relationship that could not be vulnerable to State 
intervention and forced testimonial disclosure.”305  Like Professor 
Chambers,306 Levinson posited that a state could regulate this privilege 
through the use of a state friendship registry,307 which would mitigate the 
risk that an individual would “thrust[] a privilege ticket into [a] confederate’s 
hands just before the commission of a crime.”308   
Although Levinson acknowledged that registration with the state would 
result in some invasion of the registrants’ privacy,309 he insisted that this 
invasion would be “little greater than the similar incursion involved in 
having to purchase a marriage license.”310  He also suggested that those 
concerned about the potential invasion of privacy could draw some comfort 
from the fact that the information contained in individual income tax 
 
can develop and coexist”); RUBIN, supra note 120, at 58 (noting the fact that “many friends are 
possible” is a benefit of friendship “not easily found in other intimate relationships, with their emphasis 
on exclusivity”). 
304. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 655 (“The privilege-ticket plan responds to the basic 
problem that there is no empirical test by which to distinguish relationships worth protecting from 
those that are not.”). 
305. Id.  Levinson assumes that a “commitment to some kind of crime-control policy” would 
limit society’s “willingness to give every individual an unlimited supply of privilege tickets.”  Id. at 659.  
But see Rosenbury, supra note 151, at 230 (“Why should individuals be forced to choose one friend over 
others for purposes of legal recognition?”). 
306. See supra notes 280–83 and accompanying text. 
307. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 657 (“Modern computers can easily be programmed to 
handle a central registry of privilege tickets.”). 
308. Id. at 657.; cf. Schoeman, supra note 33, at 267 (“[R]ecognizing a privilege for intimate 
friendship would give persons conspiring to commit a crime a facile means of precluding admission of 
excellent sources of evidence simply by pretending that they are intimate friends.”). 
309. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 657 (observing “[t]here is, of course, an incursion on privacy 
in requiring public registration” that would “give the State entree into the intimate lives of its citizenry 
simply by looking up the lists”); cf. Schoeman, supra note 33, at  267 (“[S]ince it is not clear who is an 
intimate friend to whom, the state could in principle recognize the privileges of confidential 
communication only after investigating the relationship to see if there really is an intimate relationship 
being protected.  But the very act of making this investigation . . . involves an intrusion into the 
relationship one might be seeking to protect . . . .”). 
310. Levinson, supra note 29, at 657; cf. Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422, 427 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1959) (asserting there is no “unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy by reporting, within a 
reasonable time, the issuance of a marriage license, . . . regardless of how anxious the parties involved 
may be to keep the information from the public”). 
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returns is generally kept confidential,311 despite the inherently public nature 
of those documents.312 
Levinson’s analysis probably overstates the confidentiality of income tax 
returns313 and, thus, by implication, of the information potentially 
contained in a state friendship registry.314  He also ignores the possibility 
that the current income tax system represents precisely the kind of 
government bureaucracy those likely to oppose the creation of a friendship 
registry might be seeking to avoid.315  In any event, Levinson apparently 
would not object to a system that, like Professor Schoeman’s,316 would 
 
311. The Internal Revenue Code “requires officers or employees of the United States to 
maintain the confidentiality of tax returns and ‘return information’ regarding specific taxpayers.”  Tax 
Analysts v. IRS, 391 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6103).  All of the states 
have laws imposing similar requirements on their taxing agencies and officials.  See People v. Gutierrez, 
222 P.3d 925, 933 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) (“[E]very . . . state in the country (including the District of 
Columbia) has adopted an analogous statutory regime, evincing a national consensus that taxpayers’ 
tax returns are considered confidential, private communications . . . .”).  These confidentiality 
requirements “stem in part from the private nature of the sensitive information contained [in individual 
tax returns], and in part from the public interest in encouraging the filing by taxpayers of complete and 
accurate returns.”  Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
312. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 657 n.71 (“[T]he duty to register does not entail that the 
information is open to public view.  Consider the confidentiality accorded to income-tax returns, for 
example, despite the fact that they are obviously ‘public’ documents that we are required to fill out.”); 
cf. Weingarten v. Superior Ct., 125 Cal. Rptr .2d 371, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“[W]e caution against 
compelled disclosure of personal tax returns except in those rare instances where the public policy 
underlying the tax privilege is outweighed by other compelling public policies or where waiver 
principles apply.”). 
313. See, e.g., United States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857, 857 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming the conviction 
of a former Internal Revenue Service employee for willfully disclosing to the public information about 
a certain federal income tax return); see also Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 
51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1102 (2003) (“With so much taxpayer information at the IRS’s disposal, 
individualized cases of misuse and inadvertent leakage of tax return information outside the agency 
seem inevitable.”).  One federal court observed that although “circuit court authority on this issue is 
scant, the district courts have held in numerous cases that tax returns are subject to discovery in 
appropriate circumstances.”  Heathman v. United States Dist. Ct., 503 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(citations omitted).  See generally William A. Edmundson, Note, Discovery of Federal Income Tax Returns and 
the New “Qualified” Privileges, 1984 DUKE L.J. 938 (discussing the academic perspective of this issue). 
314. Levinson himself described as “altogether too plausible” the possibility that the state 
“could not itself be trusted to obey laws prohibiting . . . inspection” of the records contained in a 
friendship registry.  Levinson, supra note 29, at 657. 
315. See generally Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax Simplification, 
2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319, 319–20 (1994) (lamenting the complexity of the federal income 
tax system and the failure of repeated congressional efforts to simplify that system). 
316. Schoeman asserted that because government registration would not necessarily be required 
in order to effectuate his proposal, “no one besides the parties to the relationship need know of their 
status unless one of them formally calls attention to it in court.”  Schoeman, supra note 33, at 268. 
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enable friends to conceal their relationship from the public until it serves 
their private interests to do otherwise: 
[T]here may be a relatively easy answer [to the privacy concerns underlying a 
privilege ticket system], which is to make the tickets, like personal checks or 
bearer bonds, effective upon being filled in and dated by the holder of the 
ticket.  Presumably such filled-in tickets could be kept in safety-deposit boxes, 
like other valuables, ready to be produced when needed.317 
VIII.    CONCLUSION 
Should the law recognize a testimonial privilege protecting confidential 
communications between friends,318 as Professor Levinson and  
a few other scholars have suggested?319  As is the case with other  
potential new privileges,320 there is no definitive answer to this  
 
317. Levinson, supra note 29, at 657–58.  In this event, Levinson apparently would support the 
imposition of a delay in the effectiveness of a privilege ticket similar to the “waiting periods” favored 
by Chambers and Schoeman: 
[T]he State might well decree that no ticket is valid until some period of time, whether thirty days 
or nine months, after its issuance by the individual.  This waiting period would serve to discourage 
one’s ticketing another not out of concern for the inherent quality of the relationship but rather 
because of the specific information being revealed and the potential for harm if it were ever 
disclosed to the authorities. 
Id. at 657. 
318. One commentator argued that testimonial privileges should encompass a “sense of fair 
play . . . wherein it would be too easy, and hence unfair and against the ‘rules of the game,’ to hound a 
man to his doom by convicting him through the lips of his own intimate friends [or] family.”  Douglas 
L. Manley, Patient, Penitent, Client and Spouse in New York, 21 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N BULL. 288, 290 (1949); 
see also Kaufman, supra note 35, at 658 (“Perhaps the law should respond to the absence of friendship 
from contemporary discourse by developing doctrine which expressly protects that relationship.  The 
Supreme Court, for example, might instantly recognize a right to friendship. . . .  And the law of 
evidence would privilege communications between friends.”). 
319. See Capers, supra note 153, at 726 (“[O]ne could seek to protect those individuals (the 
majority of us?) who are more likely to confide in a friend than a family member.  In other words, there 
could be an evidentiary privilege for confidential communications between friends, as Sanford 
Levinson has suggested.”); Markel et al., supra note 26, at 1205 n.316 (discussing Levinson’s “effort to 
think through how we might furnish testimonial privileges to friends”). 
320. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 
1010 n.12 (D.N.J. 1989) (“For a small percentage of people the psychotherapist-patient privilege may 
have a marked bearing on the efficacy of their therapy and in a small percentage of judicial proceedings 
the psychotherapist-privilege may have a marked bearing on the accuracy of proceedings.  Which is 
more important?  This question is not subject to empirical validation but calls instead for the weighing 
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question.321  Although the federal and many state courts undoubtedly have 
the authority to recognize a friendship privilege,322 courts have traditionally 
been reluctant to recognize new privileges323 “even when persuasive 
justifications support the privilege.”324 
Moreover, despite the possible arguments made in support of a friendship 
privilege,325 the definitional and administrative problems Levinson 
identified are real.326  Those problems would not be adequately remedied 
by his proposal (and those of other commentators)327 that the parties 
 
of values.”) (quoting Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical 
Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 928 (1982)). 
321. See, e.g., Leib, supra note 30, at 700 (“Should the law of evidence allow us to claim a 
friendship privilege?  That is a question I cannot answer here . . . .”); see also Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 
624 n.25 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (“One can never prove that costs outweigh benefits or 
vice-versa with regard to a particular privilege: such arguments inevitably degenerate into simple 
unsupported assertions.” (quoting Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1666)). 
322. See, e.g., Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 44 (D.D.C. 2007) (asserting “[p]reviously 
unrecognized common law testimonial privileges may be recognized by federal courts”); In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena, 926 A.2d 280, 284 (N.H. 2007) (“[T]he court has the inherent power to ‘develop new 
rules of privilege on common-law principles in cases coming before it.’” (quoting N.H. R. EVID. 501)); 
see also Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as Surrogate Parents: Implications for Role Definition and 
Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1803 (1996) (noting “courts continue to have the power to 
recognize the existence of a privilege”). 
323. See, e.g., Port v. Heard, 594 F. Supp. 1212, 1219 (S.D. Tex.—Houston 1984) (“The federal 
courts have generally approached the creation or recognition of new privileges against giving testimony 
with extreme caution. . . .  [P]rivileges are disfavored generally and are created or newly-recognized but 
rarely.”), aff’d, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985); In the Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 722 N.E.2d 450, 
455 n.12 (Mass. 2000) (“We have recognized very few common-law privileges.”); see also In the Matter 
of Gail D., 525 A.2d 337, 339 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (“[T]he recognition of a privilege not . . . 
firmly embodied in common-law has usually been the subject of judicial restraint”). 
324. Franklin, supra note 67, at 166; cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. 
Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“The inability . . . to reach agreement on the costs and benefits of 
a . . . privilege strongly cautions against . . . finding that such a privilege should . . . be enshrined in 
common law.”). 
325. See Schoeman, supra note 33, at 257–58 (asserting “principled arguments can be adduced 
for expanding testimonial privileges into areas not presently contemplated—specifically to cover 
confidential communication between intimate friends”); Parent-Child Loyalty, supra note 26, at 924–25 
(“[A] spirited argument can be made for conferring a testimonial privilege upon close friends, who . . . 
feel a sense of loyalty that is generally admired and valued in our society.”). 
326. See Gelzinis, supra note 31, at 527 (“Any attempt to give friendships a firmer legal footing 
runs into the problem of defining precisely who a friend is.”); Kerr, supra note 40, at 4 (“A definition 
for friendship has been perennially elusive.”).  But see Light v. NIPSCO Indus., Inc., 747 N.E.2d 73, 77 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (Mathias, J., dissenting) (“A friend is no less a friend because the law does not 
define what friendship is.”). 
327. See, e.g., Gelzinis, supra note 31, at 529 (noting Professor Chambers’ proposal “recognizes 
that individuals are best suited to say who their close friends are”); see also Rosenbury, supra note 151, 
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themselves be permitted to define the protected relationship.328  This 
difficulty alone might warrant the rejection of a friendship privilege.329  One 
commentator made this point in the following terms: 
[T]he law does not and cannot reasonably grant protection to every close 
relationship formed among nonfamily members.  Administration of such a 
privilege would be extremely difficult—involving problems of defining 
intimate relationships, determining expectations within the relationship, and, 
importantly, weeding out collusive schemes among friends.330 
Even Levinson ultimately seemed uncertain of the merits of a friendship 
privilege,331 and in particular, of the viability of his privilege ticket 
proposal.332  His proposal has drawn little interest from the courts and 
 
at 203 (“On the most basic level, the state does not specify the terms of friendship, leaving it up to 
individuals to define the interaction.”). 
328. See Atene v. Lawrence, 239 A.2d 346, 350 (Pa. 1968) (“‘friends’ is an elastic term and, when 
its limits are left to the judgment or imagination of the interrogated person, it could include the merest 
acquaintances”); RUBIN, supra note 120, at 8 (noting “one person will claim as a friend someone who 
doesn’t reciprocate”); cf. Kerr, supra note 40, at 5 (“We might not want the law . . . requiring us to draw 
lines, and sometimes we ourselves might be unsure of where we want our relationships to fall on the 
spectrum of acquaintance to pal.”). 
329. See Kaufman, supra note 35, at 655 (asserting the law’s failure to recognize a friendship 
privilege “may be justified because of the difficulty of defining and limiting the friend-friend 
relationship”); cf. Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 71 (3d Cir. 2000) (“There is good reason for favoring 
relatively uncomplicated confidential relationships in assessing candidates for the application of 
evidentiary privileges as contemplated by Rule 501.”); Covey, supra note 37, at 898 (“Ease in identifying 
protected parties plays an important role in the creation of new privileges.”). 
330. Covey, supra note 37, at 897; cf. Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth 
Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 60 (2009) (“Courts regularly provide testimonial 
privileges designed to protect the confidentiality and intimacy of particular kinds of relationships. . . .  
Not all worthy relationships receive these benefits, however.  Loving, but non-marital, relationships 
are denied the privilege, as are other forms of friendship.”). 
331. Revisiting the issue a number of years after his privilege article was published, Levinson 
observed: “Our legal system does not privilege friendship (or even family relations) above the duties 
of citizenship, and I do not necessarily believe this is a bad thing.”  Sanford Levinson, Afterword, 
38 TULSA L. REV. 779, 789–90 (2003). 
332. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 661 (“The additional ‘freedom’ allowed by the privilege-
ticket plan would be illusory.  It would be more than offset by the discontent attendant on its private 
administration.  The present scheme, problematic as it may be, has the virtue of not encouraging 
constant calibration of the levels of one’s relationships.  . . . Indeed, ‘friendship’ itself might even be 
diminished as a result of the additional recognition that it is not a “natural” status, but instead the 
product of specific cultures and ways of life that are capable of transformation.”). 
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other commentators,333 as he has acknowledged334 and clearly even 
anticipated.335  As another commentator explained: 
Sanford Levinson argues . . . that as a matter of principle friends should be 
included within the privilege to remain silent.  But on the way from principle 
to workable rule, the point often gets lost.  The law is a rough instrument, and 
despite these sentiments repeatedly voiced, the rules of privilege cover only 
some relationships of loyalty.336 
Nevertheless, Levinson convincingly argued that the law is undervaluing 
friendship by failing to accord friends the same freedom from testimonial 
compulsion enjoyed by married persons and, in some jurisdictions,337 those 
in other intimate family relationships.338  At a minimum, Levinson’s 
“provocative argument on behalf of a testimonial privilege for friends”339 
deserves more serious consideration than it has received to date.340  
 
333. See Leib, supra note 30, at 699 (“Levinson’s particular proposal—allowing people to issue 
a finite number of ‘privilege’ tickets to whomever they want, including friends and family—has gained 
little traction and no adherents.”). 
334. See Sanford Levinson, Structuring Intimacy: Some Reflections on the Fact that the Law Generally 
Does Not Protect Us Against Unwanted Gazes, 89 GEO. L.J. 2073, 2079 (2001) (“To put it mildly, the 
proposal has gathered no support, and we all remain almost completely vulnerable to the state’s putting 
pressure on most of the people with whom we are likely in fact to exchange intimacies.”). 
335. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 656 (“I suspect that most readers will greet this thought 
experiment with absolute disbelief, if not ridicule.”). 
336. FLETCHER, supra note 290, at 82. 
337. See Levinson, supra note 29, at 645 (“Family relationships other than the spousal are 
generally not recognized as conferring testimonial privilege, although several courts have recently 
recognized a parent-child privilege. . . .  Friendship per se goes wholly unprotected.”); Baumgartel, 
supra note 36, at 107 n.134 (“Most communications among family members and friends are not 
privileged.”). 
338. See Kaufman, supra note 35, at 655 (asserting “the absence of friendship from the list of 
[protected] relationships . . . devalues that relationship”); Rosenbury, supra note 151, at 202 (“The 
values underlying state respect of intimate association . . . are present not only in marriages, parent-
child relationships, or other groupings of relatives but can also be present in friendships.”); cf. Harvey 
Gelb, Corporate Governance and the Independence Myth, 6 WYO. L. REV. 129, 143 (2006) (“How is a court 
to say that the intensity of a voluntary friendship deserves less weight than the intensity of an 
involuntary family relationship?”); Stern, supra note 119, at 625 (noting “the special recognition that 
the law has given to the bonds between spouses and among family members as compared to friends”). 
339. Parent-Child Loyalty, supra note 26, at 925 n.80 (discussing Levinson, supra note 29); see also 
Diehl v. State, 698 S.W.2d 712, 717 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. ref’d) (Levy, J., 
dissenting) (acknowledging Levinson’s “innovative and stimulating discussion”). 
340. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. L.J. 2117, 2135 (2001) 
(“I like Levinson’s creative proposal of privilege tickets, which focuses on the intimacy of the 
relationship rather than the sensitivity of the information, although I assume that a privilege ticket 
could be overcome in especially egregious cases.”). 
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Perhaps the present article will serve to generate further debate over the 
propriety of such a privilege.341 
  
 
341. See Leib, supra note 30, at 699 (“Levinson highlighted an interesting problem, whose 
solution may lie in further consideration of how the law could protect a friendship’s privilege of privacy.  
If the law developed a recognizable category of friend, perhaps we would not need to distribute tickets 
to figure out who is entitled to the privilege of privacy.”). 
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